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CASE
UPDATES
County May Exceed Statutory Fee For Copy
Of Public Record
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION No. 01-605
THE HONORABLE BYRON SHER, MEMBER OF THE STATE SENATE, has requested
an opinion on the following question:
Does a county board of supervisors have statutory authority to
charge a fee for a copy of a public record that exceeds the fee
amount authorized by the California Public Records Act?
CONCLUSION
A county board of supervisors has statutory authority to charge a
fee for a copy of a public record that exceeds the fee amount authorized
by the California Public Records Act provided that the fee set by
the county does not exceed the amount reasonably necessary to recover
the cost to the county of providing the copy. In granting such statutory
authority, the Legislature has specified exceptions for fees charged
in furnishing copies of certain public records.
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No Liability For Employer Where
Non-Employee Sexually Harasses Employee
SALAZAR v. DIVERSIFIED PARATRANSIT, INC.
(2002)103 Cal. App. 4th 131
Raquel Salazar was hired as a bus driver to transport developmentally
disabled adults and children. Ernest Rocha, one of the passengers, had
been disruptive on past occasions and three female drivers filed reports
of incidents in which Rocha exposed himself to them prior to Salazar's
employment.
Salazar drove a few days with another driver, David,
to learn the route and Rocha was a passenger. On days when she worked
with David, Rocha got out of his seat and touched Salazar's hair, called
her "bonita," meaning beautiful and wanted to be by Salazar's side.
Salazar had to place Rocha back in his seat on several occasions. Although
uncomfortable from the start with Rocha's actions, Salazar continued
to drive the route.
On one occasion Salazar stopped the bus to put Rocha
back in his seat and saw Rocha's zipper and belt down and his genitals
exposed and Rocha tried to grab her arms. A second incident occurred
shortly thereafter while Salazar stopped the bus and was waiting to
pick up another passenger. Looking in her mirror, Salazar saw Rocha
coming toward her. Salazar tried to get out of her seat, but Rocha attacked
her and exposed his genitals. Salazar yelled for help from nearby drivers
who were waiting for passengers and hit Rocha with her arm. Rocha touched
her all over and tried to put his hands under her shirt and shorts.
Salazar scratched his face, honked the horn, and tried to kick him.
The attack ended when two male drivers from other buses came to her
aid. Salazar submitted a written report and two days later decided she
could no longer work for DPI and quit.
Salazar filed an action against DPI alleging four causes
of action: sexual harassment in violation of the FEHA, and California
Constitution, article I, section 8; constructive discharge in violation
of public policy; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The case was tried before
a jury. At the conclusion of Salazar's case, defendants moved for a
directed verdict, which the trial court granted.
The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,
affirmed judgement for the defendants, holding that Government Code
section 12940, subdivision (j)(1) and (k) did not create employer liability
when a non-employee client or customer sexually harasses an employee.
The Court noted that the Legislature considered proposed
1984 legislation which would have amended the statute to make an employer
liable for harassment by clients or customers, but rejected that amendment
and did not enact it into law. The Court also opined that the Legislature,
not the court, should draft and enact statues that define the scope
of employer liability.
The Appellate Court pointed out that employees have non-FEHA
remedies against harassment by a client or customer. The employee retains
the right to institute a lawsuit based on non-statutory causes of action,
and can bring a civil action seeking both tort damages and injunctive
relief. An employee who suffers harassment can obtain a temporary restraining
order and an injunction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
527.6. And, the Court noted, if harassment takes the form of sexual
battery, the employee has a right of action in tort for damages and
for injunctive and other equitable relief pursuant to Civil Code section
1708.5.
- How this affects your agency: Although this court
found no liability, departments would be remiss in not aggressively
pursuing the rights of employees to be free from this type of activity
where the agency has control over the client, customer, or vendor.
Employees, however, should be reminded that their contacts and dealings
with arrestees, detainees and members of the public in street situations,
often will expose them to unwanted, unwelcome and unsolicited conduct.
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Reserve Police Officer Not Entitled
To CCW Endorsement As Honorably Retired Peace Officer
HAAS v. ROY MEISNER, et al.
(2002)103 Cal. App. 4th 580
Richard Haas served as a reserve officer for the Berkeley Police Department
from 1969 until 1996. Haas had obtained the training set forth in Penal
Code section 832.6 and carried a firearm. Until the mid-1990's, reserve
officers served on a volunteer basis and only received pay for time
spent helping the police department at special events such as football
games or street races. In 1995, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (29
U.S.C. 201, et seq.), Berkeley began paying the reserve officers minimum
wage for all of the hours worked. In addition, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-508 (42 U.S.C. 410(a)(7)) required that
cities enroll all employees, including employees such as Haas, in social
security or an equivalent plan if they were not members of the employer's
retirement plans. Berkeley offered the Public Agency Retirement System
(PARS), a social security alternate plan, to its hourly employees such
as police department reserve officers.
Haas "retired" on August 31, 1996 and, under section
500.80 of the police department's Reserve Manual, was given a retirement
badge and identification card. Relying upon a November 1995 Berkeley
City Attorney legal opinion, the police department issued Haas an identification
card containing an endorsement permitting him to carry a concealed weapon.
In September 1997, the Berkeley City Attorney issued another legal opinion
which stated that it "overrules and supersedes the entire legal opinion
dated November 8, 1996." The new opinion concluded that "Under Penal
Code section 12027(a), honorably retired reserve officers are not entitled
to a CCW endorsement on their ID cards."
In 2001, Haas requested a renewal of his CCW endorsement,
which was expiring in September 2001. Based on the 1997 city attorney
opinion Haas was was notified that the police department did not have
the authority to issue him a CCW endorsement. Haas filed a petition
for writ of mandate requesting the court to order renewal of his CCW
endorsement, which the trial court denied.
The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,
affirmed, concluding that Haas did not satisfy the requirement of being
an "honorably retired" peace officer under section 12027, subdivision
(a)(1)(A), because he never qualified for and accepted a service or
disability retirement.
The Court noted that the Legislature amended section
12027 in 1993 to define the term "honorably retired" as "all peace officers
who have qualified for, and have accepted a service or disability retirement."
But, the Court pointed out, the statute did not specify that "honorably
retired" means simply qualifying for and accepting retirement; rather,
it specifies that the person must qualify for and accept "service or
disability" retirement. The Court also stated that, here, qualifying
for PARS did not depend upon meeting a certain threshold for years of
service and that Haas's retirement was simply an honorary recognition
for years of service; it had no attendant monetary consequence.
Accordingly, by including a peace officer who qualified
for and accepted a service or disability retirement, the Court concluded
the Legislature intended to exclude reserve officers and short-term
officers. The Court noted that the Legislature defined reserve officers
as a category of peace officers under section 830.6. Section 12050,
subdivision (a)(1)(C), provides that a police chief has the discretion
to decide whether to issue an active reserve officer a license to carry
a concealed weapon. If the police chief decides to issue a license to
carry a concealed weapon to an active reserve officer, the reserve officer's
concealed weapons license "shall be invalid upon the conclusion of the
person's appointment pursuant to section 830.6 ... ." (Section 12050,
subdivision (a)(2)(B)).
Haas, the court observed, may request permission to carry
a concealed weapon under section 12050, but he has no "right" to a CCW
endorsement, under section 12027.
- How this affects your agency: In addition to clarifying
that reserves are not entitled to CCW endorsements upon giving up
their reserve status, this case is significant because it explicitly
states that reserve officers DO NOT RETIRE; they merely stop working.
Ceremonies, and the issuance of "retirement" badges for reserves,
create a false impression that one has "retired." Such activities
have been used in lawsuits by former reserves, against their former
agencies, alleging that those actions by their agency proved they
were entitled to "retirement benefits."
Additionally, agencies should secure advice regarding requirements
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 201, et seq) and payment
for services. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
410(a)(7)), dealing with enrollment in social security or an equivalent
plan, should also be reviewed. Departments should consult their City
Attorney, County Counsel or designated Legal Advisor about these two
issues.
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[The Law Offices
of Jones & Mayer located in Fullerton, California focus its practice
on representing the interests of public entities as its City Attorney,
in labor negotiations, in defending tort litigation and civil rights
litigation. Martin Mayer focuses his practice in the area of representing
cities, counties and the State on matters arising out of their respective
law enforcement agencies.]
As always, before taking any
legal actions be certain to seek appropriate legal advice, whether it
is from a city attorney, county counsel, or your police legal advisor.
If you have any questions or wish to discuss these cases in more detail,
please do not hesitate to call us at (714) 446-1400.
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