CASE UPDATES

By: Martin J. Mayer
and
Mervin D. Feinstein

ADA Claim Cannot Proceed If Disabled Worker Is Not Qualified

BRAUNLING v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., 220 F.3d 1154 (2000).

After a ten-year career in the loan industry Donna Braunling, who suffered from Multiple Sclerosis, began employment at Countrywide as an underwriting supervisor. Her requests not to be scheduled to work on the early morning shift and not to be assigned projects that required her to take work home were granted. After one year, she requested a transfer to an available position as senior underwriting supervisor, a job with significantly larger responsibilities. Her request was approved and she was placed under the direct supervision of Cathy Kister.

Braunling was unable to perform in a satisfactory manner in her new position and was counseled verbally and in writing by Kister and other supervisors. Braunling requested a transfer to another supervisor, which was denied, and she was subsequently terminated. Braunling filed a complaint alleging causes of action under California's FEHA for disability discrimination and later added a federal cause of action under the ADA. The case was removed by Countrywide from state to federal court and the district court granted Countrywide's motion for summary judgment on all claims. The United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit affirmed.

In order to qualify for relief under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a disabled person within the meaning of the statute; (2) she is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job she holds or seeks; and (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.

To comply with the anti-discrimination laws, an employer must reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability unless the employer can show that such an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the running of the business. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that a reasonable accommodation is possible and reassignment to another position is generally considered a reasonable accommodation.

Braunling had shown that she was not qualified for the job as senior underwriting supervisor. She failed to demonstrate that her reduced performance as a senior under writing supervisor was attributable to Countrywide's failure to transfer her away from Kister's supervision. The fact that Braunling was underperforming in her new position regardless of her MS went to show that the accommodation she suggested, a transfer to another supervisor, would not have improved her situation.

/ How does this affect your agency?

Departments should review their accommodation policy to ensure, as here, that assignments are made based upon the employees qualifications to perform the essential job elements with or without accommodation. Performance, not disability should be the criteria upon which an employee is evaluated and where a reasonable accommodation is possible to improve performance it should be given.

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Probation Search Must Be Conducted For Probation Purposes Only

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. KNIGHTS and SIMONEAU, 219 F.3d 1138 (2000).

The United States appealed from an order which suppressed evidence seized from the home of Mark James Knights in a warrant less search conducted by members of the Napa County Sheriff's Department.

Pacific Gas & Electric Company's facilities in Napa County had been the subject of vandalism over 30 times. Incidents included short circuits caused by throwing chains onto transformers, damaging of gas power switches, and damaging power pole guy wires. Knights and his friend Simoneau were stopped near a PG&E gas line by a deputy who observed that Simoneau's pick-up truck contained pipes, pieces of chain, tools, and gasoline, and they could not explain their presence. A few days after the stop a pipe bomb was detonated against the exterior of a building, where a burglary had taken place, not far from Knight's residence.

Telephone service to the Napa County Airport was knocked out by someone who broke into a Pacific Bell telecommunications vault and set it afire. Brass padlocks which secured the vault and an adjacent PG&E power transformer had been removed, and a gasoline accelerant was used to ignite the fire. Within a short time after that incident, a deputy drove by Knights' residence and observed Simoneau's truck parked in front. The deputy felt the hood of the truck and found it still warm, suggesting that Knights and Simoneau may have been involved.

Detective Hancock set up surveillance of Knights' apartment and observed Knights and Simoneau arrive in Simoneau's pickup, enter the apartment and remain with the lights on until about 3:10 a.m. when Simoneau emerged carrying three cylindrical items cradled in his arms. Simoneau walked to the truck where he placed an object shaped like a jar in the back, then walked across the street to the bank of the Napa River, disappearing from view. Det. Hancock heard three splashes then observed Simoneau return to the truck without the cylinders, pick up a glass jar from the truck bed and wipe it with a cloth, climb into the truck and depart.

Det. Hancock trailed Simoneau until he stopped in a driveway. When Det. Hancock entered the driveway Simoneau was not around and Det. Hancock saw a number of suspicious objects in and about the truck. In the bed of the truck were a Molotov cocktail, explosive materials, a gasoline can and two brass padlocks, which fit the description given by PG&E investigators of the locks removed from the Pacific Bell and PG&E transformer vault two days earlier. The truck was seized, impounded, and later searched pursuant to a warrant.

Det. Hancock then decided that he would conduct a warrantless probation search of Knights' home, because Knights had been placed on summary probation after he was convicted of a misdemeanor drug offense. A term of that probation required Knights to submit his ... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer. Relying upon that and the authorization of his supervisor, Det. Hancock proceeded.

After breaking through a door and entering the apartment where Knights was still in bed, the search turned up detonation cord, ammunition, unidentified liquid chemicals, instruction manuals on chemistry and electrical circuitry, bolt cutters, telephone pole-climbing spurs, drug paraphernalia, photographs and blueprints stolen from the burglarized building, and a brass padlock stamped PG&E.

Knights moved to suppress the seized evidence and the government asserted that it was conducted pursuant to a probation consent. The district court agreed with Knights that the claimed probation search was really a subterfuge for an investigative search and ordered suppression. The United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit affirmed the suppression order.

The court observed that there was little doubt that Knights did consent to searches when he agreed to the terms of his probation, but pointed out that it had previously made it clear that such consent must be seen as limited to probation searches, and must stop short of investigative searches. The court stated that unlike an investigation search, a probation search should advance the goals of probation, the overriding aim of which is to give the [probationer] a chance to further and to demonstrate his rehabilitation while serving a part of his sentence outside the prison walls.

The court opined that while Det. Hancock was performing his duty and had drawn some very good inferences from the facts, he was using the probation term as a subterfuge to enable him to search Knights' home without a warrant. In so doing, he crossed the frontier that separates citizen privacy from official enthusiasm. For at least three decades, the court noted, it has been the law of this circuit that subterfuge probation searches are unconstitutional.

/ How does this affect your agency?

In addition to losing the use of valuable evidence in the criminal prosecution, the liability exposure for the agency and the investigator is intensified. The investigator stands to loose his/her qualified immunity inasmuch as the law is well settled where probation searches are undertaken to assist undergoing investigations. Training should periodically refocus on search and seizure laws, as well as probation and parole search criteria.

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Police Personnel Files Are Absolutely Privileged From Disclosure Under The CPRA

FILARSKY v. CITY OF MANHATTAN BEACH, 82 Cal. App. 4th 1057 (2000).

Steve A. Filarsky an attorney experienced in representing public entities represented the City of Pismo Beach, in 1986, in an action that ended with the termination of Police Officer Paul Marshall for use of excessive force and inhumane treatment of a ward at a juvenile facility. In 1999, Filarsky, a City of Manhattan Beach resident, learned that the City had recently hired Marshall as its police captain.

Filarsky, pursuant to California's Public Records Act (CPRA), sought certain records from the City pertaining to its decision to hire Marshall. The City decided that the records sought were confidential and exempt from disclosure and notified Filarsky. When Filarsky threatened litigation if he did not get the records, the City filed a declaratory relief action seeking a determination that its decision denying Filarsky's request was legally correct.

The trial court found the records requested were exempt from disclosure and granted declaratory relief against Filarsky. Filarsky sought a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court's order contending (1) a public entity may never seek declaratory relief against a citizen seeking records under the CPRA, and (2) the records he sought were not exempt from disclosure. The California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District concluded that the trial court was correct, denied Filarsky's petition for the writ of mandate, and awarded the city it's costs.

The court pointed out that unlike City of Santa Rosa v. Press Democrat, 187 Cal.App.3d 1315 (1986), where the public agency never made any prior disclosure determination, the City in this case was not seeking to avoid its legislatively mandated administrative discretion under the CPRA and have the trial court make the disclosure determination in the first instance. Here, the court continued, Filarsky disagreed with the City's decision and its reasons for non-disclosure and let the City know of his disagreement. When the City refused to disclose the documents, Filarsky threatened the City with a court intervention if he did not get them. The City again responded and gave its reasons for its prior decision that the requested documents were exempt from disclosure. There was an actual and live controversy between Filarsky and the City and the City's declaratory relief action was not inappropriate given the circumstances of the case.

The City contended that the documents Filarsky requested were personnel records and were not subject to disclosure because they were exempt under Government Code section 6254, subdivision (k). Citing the holdings in City of Hemet v. Superior, 37 Cal.App. 4th 1411 (1995) and City of Richmond v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.App. 4th 1430 (1995), the court stated that is was now well settled that the Penal and Evidence Codes govern disclosure of police personnel records and take priority over the discovery provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, as well as a citizen's request for public records under the CPRA.

This court rejected Filarsky's argument under Bradshaw v. City of Los Angeles, 221 Cal.App. 3d 908 (1990) and concluded that police personnel files were confidential beyond their use in civil or criminal proceedings and were absolutely privileged from disclosure under the CPRA.

Citing Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.3d 1325 (1991), the court also concluded that the eligibility list of applicants for the police captain position reflected the City's decision making and deliberative process and was therefore exempt from disclosure. Such disclosure, this court noted, would compromise the City's decision making process and its ability to safeguard the names and rating scores of candidates who applied for such positions.

/ How does this affect your agency?

This case reaffirms that personnel records of law enforcement officers can only be accessed utilizing the process set forth in Evidence Code 1040, et seq and are exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. Demands made under the CPRA must be carefully evaluated not everything is subject to its provisions.

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Whether Officers Had Reasonable Suspicion To Stop or Probable Cause To Arrest Was Sufficient Question For Jury

YOUNG HO CHOI v. GASTON, et al, 220 F.3d 1010 (2000).

On July 13, 1996, about 8:59 p.m., a man driving a BMW was stopped by CHP Officer Donald Burt. The man shot Officer Burt, took Burt's service revolver and CHP vehicle and drove off. A police broadcast reported an assault with a deadly weapon on a CHP officer and that the officer's weapon and vehicle had been stolen. At 9:10 p.m., a police broadcast identified the suspect as a MV (Male Vietnamese), Phu Nguyen, 5' 10", Black, Brown, 18 years old wearing a white T-shirt and black pants. About 9:30 p.m., an abandoned CHP vehicle was reported at Mills Ford in Anaheim.

At 9:40 p.m., a police broadcast reported that the suspect was known and police units were at his residence and at his girlfriend's home. At about 9:41 p.m., Anaheim Reserve Officer Christopher Marshall together with Anaheim Officer Mark Brucks, drove to Mills Ford and found the vehicle to be that of CHP Officer Donald Burt. As they approached they saw a man wearing a white T-shirt and colored pants running from the Ford dealership and, went in search of the man they had seen running.

About two minutes later they saw two men standing at the corner of Lincoln and Euclid, about 1/5 of a mile from the Ford dealership. One was a male Hispanic, about 5' 8", with dark hair, wearing a white T-shirt and tan colored pants. The other appeared to the officers to be a male Asian, about 5' 7", with dark hair, wearing a white shirt and dark-colored pants, subsequently identified as Yong Ho Choi, a Korean citizen, 32 years old, 5' 7", 145 pounds.

The officers got out of their car with weapons drawn and told the two men to put their hands in the air. Choi was then handcuffed and made to lie on the ground. He was asked no questions by either officer. About three to five minutes later, CHP Acting Sergeant Brame arrived at Lincoln and Euclid, and was informed by the Anaheim officers that the two men had been observed running westbound on Lincoln Avenue from the vicinity of the abandoned CHP unit.

Choi was placed in Sgt. Brame's unit and driven into a parking lot on the northwest corner of Euclid and Lincoln, where they were met by CHP Sergeant Sechrist. Scot Gore, a security guard who said he had seen a man, not a CHP officer, driving a CHP car and heard of the shooting believed he could identify the driver, was brought to the location. Sgt. Sechrist told Mr. Gore to look through the window of the CHP vehicle where Choi was seated. Gore nodded his head affirmatively and said that it was the man he had seen earlier driving the CHP vehicle on the Freeway. At 10:10 p.m. a police broadcast stated that Scott Gore says he can identify both parties.

A little after midnight two witnesses to the shooting looked at Choi and declared that he was the man who had been stopped by Officer Burt. Three other persons who had seen a man leaning over Officer Burt's body also identified Choi as that man.

Hung Mai, a Vietnamese, later pled guilty to the murder of Officer Burt.

Choi sued for various violations of constitutional and statutory rights. The district court gave summary judgment for all defendants as to use of unreasonable force, and Choi's claims of impermissibly suggestive field identification procedure, defamation, conspiracy, and state law claims. The United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded Choi's cause of action against Reserve Anaheim Officer Marshall and Officer Brucks, for trial, affirming the remainder of the district court's decision.

The court noted that the Anaheim officers who with drawn weapons ordered Choi to the ground had little to go on, however noted that they said that they had been informed by police radio that the suspect was Oriental. The police radio log however showed that the officers had been informed the suspect was a particular man noted as Vietnamese and particularly identified not by race or ethnicity but by name -- Phu Nguyen. The court stated that the officers then generalized from this information to a classification embracing 2 billion persons.

The court observed that the officers also knew the height, weight and age of Phu Nguyen, which did not match Choi's height, weight or age, nor did Choi's clothing match Nguyen's. The court opined that except for their rash generalization, the officers had no reason to think Choi was their man, save that he was within 1/5 of a mile from the abandoned CHP vehicle, and without basis in fact told the CHP that they had seen both men running from the abandoned vehicle.

The court pointed out that as they were investigating someone suspected of a violent crime against a police officer, it was not unreasonable for them to pull their guns and pat down the suspect, however it was difficult to characterize what they did as investigatory when they did not ask Choi a single question, and within two minutes they took Choi into custody.

The court noted that at the factual center of this case was the ease with which a member of a minority in a community may be confused with other persons not even of the same race or ethnicity who in the eyes of the majority look like him. Here Choi, a Korean in his thirties, short and slim, was confused with a Vietnamese teenager, who was taller and heavier apparently because, to the community majority, he looked Asian or Oriental.

The court noted that only stereotyping of this sort can account for the firm identification of Choi by those who had seen the actual murderer and stated we cannot hold them accountable for their convention-bound vision. We can, however expect more of police moving in a community of many ethnicities.

The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on whether the Anaheim police had enough to justify a Terry stop; whether they had conducted a Terry stop; and whether they had arrested Choi without probable cause.

/ How does this affect your agency?

With the current emphasis on racial profiling it is incumbent on departments to not stress the importance of thoroughness over expediency, and accuracy in relaying information both in the field and to the field from communications. Only through continued training in recognizing the similarities and differences in our diversified community cultures will the tendency to generalize be minimized. Additional relevant training may be necessary and appropriate.

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Speech That Promotes Tension, Impairs Discipline And Is Not Directed To Public Not Protected

COCHRAN & ANDERSON v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 2000 WL 1159296 (9th Cir. Cal.).

Sergeant Stanley Cochran, a white male with 23 years experience, transferred to Foothill Division and was assigned as a Patrol Supervisor to train and supervise officers. Lieutenant Kathy Age, a black female, day watch commander became Sgt. Cochran's immediate supervisor. The two did not develop a positive working relationship. Sgt. Cochran believed Lt. Age had a bad work ethic, was troubled by comments Age made that suggested she would seek revenge against an officer who had filed a complaint against her, and disapproved of the manner in which she reacted to an incident where an officer in the division had shot himself. The problem between the two escalated over the handling of a complaint against Sgt. Cato, a black male, for allegedly sleeping in his patrol car.

Sergeant Dean Anderson, a white male, and Sgt. Cochran's best friend transferred to Foothill and was assigned to be the Complaint Sergeant, reporting directly to Captain Robert Gale. Sgt. Anderson's assignment was to investigate citizen claims regarding officer misconduct. Sgt. Anderson also developed problems with Lt. Age within a few months.

Sgt. Anderson made several reports to Capt. Gale regarding Lt. Age allegedly giving white officers less favorable reports than she gave black officer. Sgt. Anderson also warned that racial tensions were worsening at Foothill, but Capt. Gale did not take action at that time. Sgt. Anderson subsequently reported to Capt. Gale that Lt. Age had been leaving work early to do administrative work at home, although she had not been assigned any administrative work at the time. When Lt. Age was caught and punished, Sgt. Anderson was dissatisfied, believing other officers would have received harsher punishments. Sgt. Anderson then reported to Capt. Gale that Lt. Age and another officer were improperly interfering with personnel complaints involving minority or female officers.

When a contract dispute arose between the City and the police union, Sgt's Anderson and Cochran actively supported the union and urged their fellow officers not to work overtime during the upcoming World Cup soccer matches. They also urged other officers to call in sick on a prearranged date "the blue flu day." One officer ignored the pressure from the police union and signed up for overtime. Sgt's Cochran and Anderson criticized the officer, who reported the incident, and Captain Gale ordered Lt. Age to file a formal personnel complaint. Sgt's Anderson and Cochran each received five-day suspensions. The Department Board of Rights found both Anderson and Cochran not guilty.

Sgt. Cochran was administratively transferred from the Foothill station to the Hollywood station. On the transfer request Capt. Gale wrote that Sgt. Cochran was one of the most proficient and dedicated supervisors, but that he allowed his personal frustration and resentment to foster a negative and hostile environment, and that his dislike for his peers and superiors had created the potential for racial problems.

Sgt. Anderson was administratively transferred to the Wilshire station. The transfer papers cited Anderson=s involvement in the union dispute, as well as his continued investigation of Sgt. Cato's sleeping complaint despite orders to stop. The papers concluded that Anderson had created a hostile work environment at Foothill.

The transfers were appealed and the Board of General appeals found that the Foothill station had a right to make the transfers, but it recommended that the written materials regarding the transfers be removed from personnel files. Chief Willie Williams, not bound by the Board's recommendations, did not authorize removal of the materials.

Sgt's Anderson and Cochran filed 1983 complaints in federal court alleging conspiracy and retaliation against them for exercising their First Amendment rights to free speech. The City moved for judgment as a matter of law and the motion was denied. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Anderson and Cochran. The United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit reversed, focusing on whether Sgt's Anderson's and Cochran's speech was of public concern and whether their interest in such speech was outweighed by the City's interest in preserving discipline and harmony within the LAPD.

The court stated that a public employee's speech or expressive conduct deals with a matter of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. Speech that deals with complaints over internal office affairs is not protected when it is not relevant to the public's evaluation of a governmental agency's performance.

The court opined that the employer's interest outweighs the employee's interest in speaking if the employee's speech impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise. The court noted that a government employer need not allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action. (Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983))

The court concluded that the Sergeant's speech impaired discipline by superiors. The statements directly challenged Lt. Age's ability to make decisions free from personal bias or preferences, and undermined her authority. Sgt. Anderson's speech and actions also tended to undermine Capt. Gale's and Capt. Bergmann's authority. Sgt. Anderson brought his investigations to the attention of Capt. Bergmann over Capt. Gale's head. Sgt. Anderson further undermined Capt. Bergmann, if not by directly disobeying his orders to stop the investigation, then by taking actions that ignored the spirit of the orders.

Although the sergeants made their direct accusations against Lt. Age privately to Capt. Gale, they interviewed other officers regarding the alleged incidents of favoritism, thus making their beliefs known to others who were subordinate to Lt. Age. The speech was not directed to the public. Furthermore, Sgt. Anderson=s continued unwillingness to accept his superiors' disposition of his complaints bordered on insubordination and raised both workplace discipline and disruption considerations.

/ How does this affect your agency?

This case reaffirms that employees cannot use the First Amendment to shield conduct that undermines the abilities of superiors to make personnel decisions, promotes tension, dissatisfaction, and is divisive. First Amendment issues must be carefully evaluated, especially when they impact on public sector employment.

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Peace Officer Defamation Statute Held Violation Of Complainant's Free Speech Right

HADDAD v. WALL, 2000 WL 1126402 (C.D.Cal.).

Joseph Haddad received a traffic citation from CHP Officer Scott Wall for failure to stop for a traffic sign, pled not guilty and was convicted in a court trial after Officer Wall testified. A fine was imposed which Haddad paid. After the conviction Haddad filed a telephonic complaint with the CHP that Officer Wall falsely testified on two matters during the court trial.

Officer Wall, pursuant to California Civil Code ' 47.5, filed a Small Claims action alleging Haddad knowingly filed a false complaint with his employer accusing him of perjury, a felony. Officer Wall then wrote to Haddad and demanded payment of $5,000. The matter went to trial and judgment was entered for Officer Wall against Haddad for $5,000 and $40 in costs. Haddad then filed an appeal in Superior Court in which Officer Wall prevailed, and was awarded $5,000 in damages, $150 in attorneys' fees, and $40 in costs.

Haddad filed an action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Eastern Division seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking a declaration that California Civil Code 47.5 was unconstitutional on its face and as applied and an injunction prohibiting Officer Wall from executing on the judgment Officer Wall obtained against him in state court.

District Court Judge Robert J. Timlin granted Haddad's motion for summary adjudication, held California Civil Code ' 47.5 unconstitutional on its face in violation of the First Amendment as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, and enjoined Officer Wall from executing on the judgment in his favor.

Addressing the constitutionality of ' 47.5, the court noted that under California Civil Code ' 47, most publications and broadcasts arising out of official government duties or proceedings are privileged, and therefore cannot be the subject of a defamation action. The privilege in CC ' 47 extends to complaints by citizens against public officials filed with an administrative agency. CC ' 47.5 creates an exception to this general privilege afforded citizen complaints against public officials and allows peace officers to bring defamation suits against individuals who falsely charge them with misconduct, criminal conduct, or incompetence.

The court stated that by providing a privilege for statements made against public officials generally and then creating an exception to such privilege for complaints filed against peace officers, California treats defamatory statements made against peace officers differently than all other public officials. The defamation law thus creates a distinction based on the content of the statements whether the complaints are about peace officers or other public officials.

The court pointed out that statements made against public officials are treated differently under the First Amendment than are statements made against private individuals. The primary concerns which motivated the Supreme Court to afford greater protection to statements made against public officials were a strong interest in debate on public issues, and a strong interest in the debate about those persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of the issues.

Noting that courts have consistently treated peace officers as public officials, the court stated that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. Quoting Imig v. Ferrar, 70 Cal.App. 3d at 56 (1977), the court stated ...it is distressing and demoralizing for police officers to be subjected to false accusations of brutality, but that may be one of the crosses that a police officer must bear, in light of the power and deadly force the state places in his hands. Concluding, the court noted that there was nothing distinguishable regarding the position or duties of peace officers which would support treating them differently from other public officials as to the law of defamation and privileges associated therewith. The fact that more complaints, including false complaints, may be filed against peace officers with their supervisors cannot be relied upon to support affording peace officers greater protection against defamatory statements than other public officials. The greater risk of public scrutiny is a necessary consequence of being involved in public affairs.

/ How does this affect your agency?

The case does not have a direct affect on department operation as much as it affects the officer's right to use the judicial system when they believe they have been wrongly accused of misconduct. We reported in Vol. Four No. Three, March 31, 2000, the case of Gritchen v. Collier, 73 F.Supp. 2d 1148 (USDC CD Ca 1999), which was the first case that held Civil Code ' 47.5 to be unconstitutional. A decision by a federal district judge is not binding on anyone other than the parties to the action. However, this is the second such decision in a short period of time and may set the stage for an appellate court to rule in the future. Use of ' 47.5 must be done with caution.

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As always, before taking any legal actions be certain to seek appropriate legal advice, whether it is from a city attorney, county counsel or your police legal advisor. If you have any questions regarding any of the above please do not hesitate to call us at (562) 590-8280.