Case Summaries
November 2007

Defense May Use Derivative Information Independently Developed
In Prior Proceeding Without Violating Prior Protective Order

Chambers v. Superior Court (San Diego Police Dept.), (2007) 42 Cal.4th 673

Officer E. and his partner responded to a report of domestic violence at Chambers' residence. Chambers became belligerent and rushed toward Officer E. three times. Officer E. used pepper spray to protect himself. Tariq Chambers was charged with resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer Chambers filed a Pitchess motion, seeking information in Officer E.'s personnel file. The trial judge found good cause to inspect Officer E.'s personnel file, but found no relevant information to disclose.

Public defender, Kristin Scogin, after being assigned to Chambers's case, was also assigned to take over a case involving a Ms. Washington, and learned Pitchess information about Officer E. that was ordered disclosed in the Washington case. Derivative information was also independently developed and Scrogin filed a supplemental Pitchess motion on behalf of Chambers.

The trial court in the Washington case had imposed a protective order limiting "[u]se of the information ordered disclosed from the officer's personnel files" to "the defense of this criminal matter." On Chambers's behalf Scogin asked the court to release the name of one of the complainants that had been disclosed to Washington . She also asked permission to use, on behalf of Chambers, the derivative information independently developed after the complainant had been disclosed to Washington . In a sealed declaration, Scogin described that derivative information, but did not refer to the complainant by name.

The city attorney opposed the supplemental motion, and Chambers ultimately sought reconsideration of his original Pitchess motion. The trial court concluded the defense was "precluded from using information developed in other Pitchess motions," but reexamined the personnel file "to make sure that [it] did not miss anything." The trial court again found no relevant information regarding other complainants.

Chamber's petition for writ of mandate to the superior court appellate division was denied. The Court of Appeal held that information regarding the complainant, disclosed in the Washington case, should be disclosed by the trial court to Chambers subject to an appropriate protective order. It further held that because it was ordering disclosure of the complainant's identity to Chambers, the deputy public defender would not violate the protective order in the Washington case if she used the derivative information acquired during investigation of the Washington matter in the Chambers case.

The California Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court's order to release the information and the derivative information that had been independently developed.

The California Supreme Court noted that the "relatively low threshold for discovery ... was offset, by ... protective provisions which: (1) explicitly 'exclude from disclosure' certain enumerated categories of information ...; (2) establish a procedure for in camera inspection by the court prior to any disclosure ...; and (3) issue a forceful directive to the courts to consider the privacy interests of the officers whose records are sought and take whatever steps 'justice requires' to protect the officers from 'unnecessary annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.'

The California Supreme Court opined that the statutory description of "records disclosed or discovered," as used in section 1045, does not extend to information subsequently developed. The California Supreme Court adopted the rule formulated by the Court of Appeal for this narrow factual situation: “When complainant information has been ordered disclosed to counsel who, when later representing a different defendant, succeeds under Pitchess in discovering the same complainant information relating to the same officer, counsel may then refer to the derivative information uncovered as part of the earlier followup investigation.”

Court of Appeal Holds California Medical Marijuana Act Not Superceded By Federal Law

City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 355

During a traffic stop, Garden Grove police seized about a third of an ounce of marijuana from Felix Kha. Kha had a doctor's approval to use marijuana for medical reasons, and the prosecutor dismissed the drug charge Kha was facing. The trial court then granted Kha's motion for return of property and ordered the Garden Grove Police Department to give back his marijuana. The City of Garden Grove , sought a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to reverse its order. The City did not contest the dismissal of the underlying drug charge, nor did it frontally challenge California 's medical marijuana laws. The City contended Kha was not entitled to the return of his marijuana because that drug is generally prohibited under federal law.

Kha claimed he is legally entitled to the return of his marijuana under state law, and as a matter of due process. Kha also argued that federal law is not controlling in this proceeding and that the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution effectively prohibits federal interference with California 's medical marijuana laws.

The City argued for the first time that although the drug charge against Kha was dismissed, he is not entitled to the protections of California 's medical marijuana laws. The City also reiterated its position that, consistent with federal drug policy, Kha's marijuana must be destroyed.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, ordered Kha to show cause why mandate should not issue and granted the Attorney General's request to file an amicus curiae brief. Siding with the trial court, the Attorney General contended: (1) The City lacks standing to challenge the court's order; (2) Kha's possession of marijuana was legal under state law; (3) state law favors the return of lawfully possessed marijuana; (4) federal law does not preclude the return of Kha's marijuana; and (5) under the Tenth Amendment, state courts cannot be compelled to implement federal drug laws. Kha's principal argument was that federal law does not override his right under state law and due process to the return of his property.

The Appellate Court noted that it had received an amici curiae brief on behalf of the California sheriffs', police chiefs', and peace officers' associations. Contrary to the Attorney General's position, these local law enforcement associations urge the Appellate Court to overturn the trial court's ruling, insisting that ordering the return of Kha's marijuana was not only legally improper, it would undermine police morale and effectiveness and send the wrong message to local law enforcement officers who are involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs.

The Appellate Court pointed out that a police department's role regarding seized property was that of a custodian for the Court and the rules are no different where, as here, the seizure involves a controlled substance and the case is dismissed prior to trial. In that situation, the police may not destroy or otherwise dispose of the seized drugs without prior judicial approval. And if the court determines the defendant was in lawful possession of the drugs, then they may not be destroyed at all. It is up to the court to decide whether destruction is appropriate in a given case; the police role is limited.

The Court concluded that “[i]n light of these considerations, we are hard pressed to see how the City has a special interest in this proceeding. Its police department does have actual custody of the subject marijuana, and the trial court's order requires the department to take certain action with respect to that property, i.e., relinquish it to its owner. So, at least in terms of physical possession, it cannot be gainsaid that the department occupies a unique role with respect to the marijuana. But its duties insofar as looking after the property and ensuring its safe transfer are plainly ministerial. No special discretion, judgment or skill is called for that would suggest the City has a special interest in the property. Like the public at large, the City certainly has a general interest in ensuring that controlled substances are only returned to individuals who have a lawful right to possess them. But beyond that, its interest appears tangential.”

Where Deputy Is Found Unfit For Duty By County, Officer Carries Burden Of Proof To Overcome Strong Presumption That County's Decision Was Correct

Sager v. County of Yuba (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1049

Sharon Sager has been a peace officer for over 30 years, including over 20 years as a deputy with Yuba County (the County). In 1992, Sager was evaluated after a mental crisis and cleared for duty with a recommendation that she see a psychiatrist to consider medication and enter therapy. However, she did neither and other mental health professionals cleared her for duty. In January 2000, Sager delivered a written complaint about personnel issues within the department to Sheriff Black, at Black's home. Sager was very emotional and took six weeks off to deal with her emotional problems.

In July 2000, Sager tried to kill herself by overdosing on pills. After a mental health evaluation she was returned to duty August 2, 2000, with "qualifications," the nature of which were disputed. In November 2000, Sager became upset when an officer with less seniority was designated "Officer in Charge" when the assigned sergeant was ill. She turned in her gun, keys and identification and said she quit. Later she tried to rescind her resignation. A visiting Superior Court Judge ruled that Sager's rescission was valid, and ordered her reinstated with back pay.

In June 2001, Sager used department resources to locate the Sacramento home address of a deputy district attorney with whom Sager believed her husband (also a deputy district attorney) was having an affair. She found her husband at the woman's house and told the woman she had better lock her back door; she later called the woman and said something like "if [I] wanted to shoot [you] [I] could do so at the courthouse." At a hearing on a civil harassment complaint against her, Sager testified that she meant to reassure the other woman that she did not plan to shoot her.

In December 2001, Sager entered a courtroom during testimony in a preliminary hearing in a gang case. Her husband was the prosecutor and the other woman was in the audience, sitting with some peace officers. Sager approached and demanded that the other woman "stop fucking my husband;" although the criminal proceedings were not disrupted, several people present in the courtroom heard this statement.

The County sought a new fitness evaluation, and after delays caused by a dispute about Sager's refusal to sign release forms, a report was filed finding that Sager was unfit for duty due to her mental condition. Sager sought an administrative appeal and the matter was heard by an ALJ, whose 23-page decision found Sager was not able to perform her duties.

Sager filed a petition for a writ of mandate to overturn the administrative finding, the trial court found in her favor, and the County appealed. The California Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court misapplied the standard of review, disregarded significant evidence, and applied the wrong substantive standard to determine whether Sager was fit for duty, and reversed with directions to deny Sager's petition.

The Appellate Court noted that the trial court was required to exercise its independent judgment of the evidence. In so acting the trial court had the power to make credibility findings. However, the trial court decision did not turn on credibility issues. In the statement of decision the trial court explained that it "is to first review with a presumption of correctness the administrative findings and then, after affording the respect due to the findings, exercise independent judgment in making its own findings." This, the Appellate Court stated, is not an accurate statement of the appropriate standard the trial court should have applied.

The trial court should have begun with a strong presumption that the County's decision was correct, and placed on Sager the burden of proof to show that the decision was against the weight of the evidence. The Court pointed to the California Supreme Court's explanation that, "[R]arely, if ever, will a board determination be disturbed unless the petitioner is able to show a jurisdictional excess, a serious error of law, or an abuse of discretion on the facts.'"

The Appellate Court strongly noted that “[i]n this case, application of the correct test to the facts in the record admits of only one conclusion: Sager failed to carry her burden to prove that the County's decision, with its strong presumption of correctness, is not supported by the evidence.”

County Not Liable For Medical Expenses For Arrestee Treatment Prior To Booking

Sharp Healthcare v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1301

A group of hospitals including Sharp Memorial Hospital sued the San Diego County Sheriff's Department and the County of San Diego after the County notified the hospitals that it would no longer pay for the medical care expenses of arrestees who receive treatment at the hospitals before they are booked or otherwise committed into county jail (referred to as "pre-commitment arrestees").

The dispute arose from conflicting interpretations of several statutes which were amended in 1992 and an appellate court decision decided before the amendments. Both parties filed motions for summary adjudication, asking the trial court to declare the parties' rights on the issue of the County's liability. Sharp requested a ruling declaring that the County was financially responsible for an arrestee's medical care expenses prior to booking into county jail, whereas the County requested a ruling declaring that it did not have this financial responsibility until after booking. The trial court granted Sharp's summary adjudication motion and denied the County's summary adjudication motion, and later entered judgment in Sharp's favor.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, based on its review of section 4015 and Government Code section 29602 after the 1992 amendments, held the County was not liable for the medical care expenses of a person arrested and treated at a hospital before the arrestee is committed to the county jail. The Court reversed the judgment in favor of Sharp, and directed the trial court to enter an order granting the County's summary adjudication motion, and to enter a judgment consistent with this opinion.