Case Summaries
September 2007

Officer's Termination For Running Porn Website
Did Not Violate First-Amendment Rights

Dible v. City of Chandler, 502 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2007)

Ronald Dible, a police officer with the City of Chandler, Arizona, and his wife Megan began running a porn-website in September of 2000, after Megan Dible signed a contract with CDM Networks, which operated the website. The Dibles posted pictures of Megan on the website, under the pseudonym "Katelynn," which portrayed Megan in various sexual poses and activities with Ronald Dible, another woman, and inanimate objects. The Dibles also posted, among other things, a videotape of Megan Dible masturbating that had been filmed by Ronald Dible. The Dibles did not intend to express any kind of message or engage in social or political commentary through the material they posted on their website. They participated in those activities to make money.

Believing that his participation in the website would violate police department policies, Ronald Dible did not inform any department officials about it. He did, however, tell a few people about it, including a fellow police officer, whom he urged to start his own website. The officer eventually did. Sometime in the later part of 2001, rumors about the Dibles' website began circulating among members of the department, and eventually the news of the website filtered up to department officials.

Upon learning about it, the police chief on January 25, 2002, ordered Ronald Dible to cease all activity with the website and placed him on administrative leave. The chief then opened an investigation into Ronald Dible = s involvement with the website. The investigators questioned Ronald Dible about it, and, in response, he provided several misleading answers.

By January 25, 2002, the press had also learned about the website and began reporting on it in an unflattering manner. The press reported that the website was run by the Dibles and that he was employed as a city police officer. Ronald Dible's employment as a police officer was terminated.

Dible appealed to the personnel board which upheld his termination and he filed suit in federal court alleging violation of his First Amendment Rights.

The district court granted summary judgment in the City's favor on each of the Dibles' claims. In its order, the district court found that, among other things, Ronald Dible's involvement in the website was not protected by the First Amendment.

The United States District Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, upholding Dible's termination. The Ninth Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court recently took up the issue of employee speech in general and conduct of the sort engaged in by Ronald Dible in particular, calling attention to City of San Diego v. Roe , 543 U.S. 77, 125 S. Ct. 521. When the Supreme Court surveyed First Amendment law as it related to government employees, it set forth an analytical framework for consideration of the issue. The Court first recognized that " [a] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment."

The Ninth Circuit pointed out that our Supreme Court has held that a governmental employer may impose certain restraints on the speech of its employees, restraints that would be unconstitutional if applied to the general public. The Court also recognized the right of employees to speak on matters of public concern, typically matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the public at large, a subject on which public employees are uniquely qualified to comment. Outside of this category, the Court has held that when government employees speak or write on their own time on topics unrelated to their employment, the speech can have First Amendment protection, absent some governmental justification "far stronger than mere speculation" in regulating it.

The Ninth Circuit stated that in this case it was not dealing with the rights of an ordinary citizen but were dealing with the rights of a governmental employee (a police officer at that) vis-à-vis his employer. Dible, the Ninth Circuit noted, clearly stated that he was not interested in conveying any message whatsoever and was engaged in the indecent public activity solely for profit.

Police departments, and those who work for them, are engaged in a dangerous calling and have significant powers. The public expects officers to behave with a high level of propriety, and, unsurprisingly, is outraged when they do not do so. The law and their own safety demands that they be given a degree of respect, and the sleazy activities of Ronald and Megan Dible could not help but undermine that respect. Nor is this mere speculation. Almost as soon as Ronald Dible's indecent public activities became widely known, officers in the department began suffering denigration from members of the public, and potential recruits questioned officers about the Dibles' website. Moreover, the department feared that the recruiting of female officers would be affected because of what it seemed to say about the climate at the department. That is not rank speculation.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that: "The City could properly take notice of the fact that officers and the department were vilipended. It could react to the effects that Ronald Dible's activities could be expected to and did have upon the police department's mission and functions. To paraphrase Justice Holmes: Ronald Dible may have the constitutional right to run his sex oriented business, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman for the City at the same time. Therefore, the Dibles' claims must fail."