Case Summaries
August 2007

Garcia v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 63 (Cal. 2007)

Jose Antonio Garcia, after being involved in an altercation with officers while being booked in the Santa Ana City jail, filed a "Pitchess" motion for discovery of law enforcement personnel records. In support, he filed a declaration under seal asserting that the declaration contained information protected by the attorney-client and work product privileges.

The California Supreme Court concluded that the trial court may permit a defendant to file a Pitchess declaration under seal if the court determines that such a filing is necessary. A declaration filed under seal must be redacted before being served on the city attorney, and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court noted that nothing in the relevant statutes precluded such a filing, and pointed out that a trial court has inherent discretion to allow documents to be filed under seal in order to protect against revelation of privileged information. Courts have recognized the efficacy of similar procedures to protect the interests of both the accused and law enforcement. The Court also noted that the "Legislature and the courts have ... sanctioned the procedure of sealing portions of a search warrant affidavit that relate facts or information which, if disclosed in the public portion of the affidavit, will reveal or tend to reveal a confidential informant's identity."

The Supreme Court concluded "Therefore we hold that when counsel wishes to file a Pitchess affidavit under seal, the following procedure should be adhered to. Counsel should give 'proper and timely notice' of the privilege claim and provide the court with the affidavit the defense seeks to file under seal, along with a proposed redacted version. The proposed redacted version ... should be served on opposing counsel. The trial court must then conduct an in camera hearing on the request to file under seal. At that hearing, counsel should explain how the information proposed for redaction would risk disclosure of privileged material if revealed, and demonstrate why that information is required to support the motion. Opposing counsel should have an opportunity to propound questions for the trial court to ask in camera. If the court concludes that parts of the affidavit do pose a risk of revealing privileged information, and that filing under seal is the only feasible way to protect that required information, the court may allow the affidavit to be so filed."

Green v. State of California, 42 Cal.4th 254 (Cal.2007)

Dwight Green began working for the State of California in 1974. In 1987, he worked as a stationary engineer for the Department of Corrections at the California Institute for Men in Chino. Green's duties included maintenance and repair of equipment and mechanical systems and supervision and instruction of a crew of inmates. In 1990, Green was diagnosed with hepatitis C, presumably contracted while working on sewer pipes at the Institute. From 1990 until 1997, Green did not have any work restrictions because of the illness, nor did he lose any time from work, was considered a good employee and received letters of commendation.

In 1997, Dr. James Wang, began treating Green with the drug Interferon or Infergen (a brand of interferon) for the hepatitis C. A single course of treatment required injections three times a week for a one-year period. The treatment caused Green to feel fatigued, have trouble sleeping, and to suffer headaches and body aches.

Green's supervisor received a letter from Dr. Wang, requesting Green be put on light duty until at least May or June of 1997. Green was accommodated and allowed to arrive to work late on the days he received Infergen injections. Green was assigned to positions that did not require heavy labor and continued to perform his duties.

In June 1999, Green injured his back while lifting a garbage disposal which was unrelated to any side effects from the interferon treatment. Green continued working, but on the recommendation of the doctor treating his back was placed on light duty. In November 1999, Green was placed on disability leave due to the employer's policy that employees could only be on light duty for a limited time.

On July 3, 2000, Green returned to work cleared for full duty, taking sick leave to attend physical therapy sessions for his back injury only, however, the Institute's return to work coordinator, reviewed Green's file and saw the 1997 doctor's report the workers' compensation's qualified medical examiner prepared at the time Green began receiving his interferon injections. The report recommended Green for light duty only and based on this report it was concluded that Green should not have been cleared for full duty work. Green then received a letter dated October 2, 2000, informing him that unless he could be cleared for full duty, he could not return to his position as a stationary engineer. Green sought permission to return to work and his request was denied, based on 1999 findings of a workers' compensation proceeding that found he had suffered a work-related injury.

Green filed a disability discrimination claim with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing. then filed a complaint for damages in superior court alleging he had been discriminated against because of his disability. The 1997 report was not admitted into evidence, and the attending physician was not allowed to testify. The jury returned a general verdict for Green, awarding him $597,088 in economic damages, and $2 million in non-economic damages.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal (Div. 2) affirmed the judgment in Green's favor. Recognizing that the trial court never instructed the jury on the element of qualification or inability to perform, the Court of Appeal held that the FEHA "does not require plaintiff to prove that he is a qualified individual. Rather, the burden is on defendant to establish that plaintiff is incapable of performing his essential duties with reasonable accommodation."

The California Supreme Court disagreed with the ruling regarding the State's burden of proof adopted by the Court of Appeal and concluded that the Legislature has placed the burden on a plaintiff to show that he or she is a qualified individual under the FEHA (i.e., that he or she can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation).

Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 278 (Cal.2007)

This case presents the question whether the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) requires the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (Commission) to disclose the names, employing departments, and hiring and termination dates of California peace officers included in the Commission's database.

The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment rendered by the superior court, which directed that the records be disclosed, because of the appellate court's conclusion that this information is obtained from peace officer personnel records which, under Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, may not be disclosed except under certain statutorily prescribed circumstances.

The California Supreme Court concluded that the records at issue were not rendered confidential by those two statutes and that the records do not come within any of the exemptions contained in the Public Records Act.

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeal, and stated that the records are subject to disclosure. However, the Supreme Court held that "upon remand to the superior court, the Commission may seek to establish that information regarding particular officers or categories of officers should be excised from the disclosed records because the safety or efficacy of the officers would be jeopardized by disclosure."