Case Summaries
June 2007

Passenger, Like Driver, Is Seized For Fourth Amendment
Purposes In Traffic Stop

Brendlin v. California, 127 S.Ct. 2400 (U.S. 2007)

After officers stopped a car to check its registration without reason to believe it was being operated unlawfully, one of them recognized petitioner Brendlin, a passenger in the car. Upon verifying that Brendlin was a parole violator, the officers formally arrested him and searched him, the driver, and the car finding, among other things, methamphetamine paraphernalia. Charged with possession and manufacture of that substance, Brendlin moved to suppress the evidence obtained in searching his person and the car, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop, which was an unconstitutional seizure of his person. The trial court denied the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Brendlin was seized by the traffic stop, which was unlawful. Reversing, the California Supreme Court held that suppression was unwarranted because a passenger is not seized, as a constitutional matter, absent additional circumstances that would indicate to a reasonable person that he was the subject of the officer's investigation or show of authority.

The United States Supreme Court reversed holding that when police make a traffic stop, a passenger in the car, like the driver, is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and so may challenge the stop's constitutionality. The Supreme Court summarized it's holding stating, in part:

"(a) A person is seized and thus entitled to challenge the government's action when officers, by physical force or a show of authority, terminate or restrain the person's freedom of movement through means intentionally applied (Citation)."

"(b) Brendlin was seized because no reasonable person in his position when the car was stopped would have believed himself free to "terminate the encounter" between the police and himself. (Citation). Any reasonable passenger would have understood the officers to be exercising control to the point that no one in the car was free to depart without police permission. A traffic stop necessarily curtails a passenger's travel just as much as it halts the driver, diverting both from the stream of traffic to the side of the road, and the police activity that normally amounts to intrusion on "privacy and personal security" does not normally (and did not here) distinguish between passenger and driver. (Citation)."

"(c) The State Supreme Court's contrary conclusion reflects three premises with which this Court respectfully disagrees. First, the view that the police only intended to investigate the car's driver and did not direct a show of authority toward Brendlin impermissibly shifts the issue from the intent of the police as objectively manifested to the motive of the police for taking the intentional action to stop the car. Applying the objective ... test resolves any ambiguity by showing that a reasonable passenger would understand that he was subject to the police display of authority. Second, the state court's assumption that Brendlin, as the passenger, had no ability to submit to the police show of authority because only the driver was in control of the moving car is unavailing. Brendlin had no effective way to signal submission while the car was moving, but once it came to a stop he could, and apparently did, submit by staying inside. Third, there is no basis for the state court's fear that adopting the rule this Court applies would encompass even those motorists whose movement has been impeded due to the traffic stop of another car. An occupant of a car who knows he is stuck in traffic because another car has been pulled over by police would not perceive the show of authority as directed at him or his car."

Giovanni B. v. Superior Court (City of Chula Vista Police Dept.), 152 Cal.App.4th 312 (Cal.Ct.Ap.2007)

The San Diego County District Attorney's Office filed a petition in juvenile court charging Giovanni B. with possession of a dirk or dagger in violation of Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)(4). Giovanni denied the charge.

Giovanni filed a Pitchess motion seeking discovery of information concerning evidence of complaints that the arresting officers, Chula Vista Police Officers Trampus and Murgia, had made false statements in their reports or committed other acts of dishonesty. Giovanni asserted the information would be relevant to a motion to suppress the weapon as the product of an unlawful search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion without conducting an in camera review of the requested records because it concluded the requested information would not establish the defense urged by Giovanni as the basis for the Pitchess motion.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, issued an order to show cause and concluded that the trial court correctly found Giovanni did not make a sufficient showing of materiality to require an in camera review of the requested records.

The Appellate Court noted that, to show good cause for discovery of confidential officer information, a Pitchess motion must (among other things) explain the proposed defense and articulate how the requested discovery may be admissible as direct or impeachment evidence in support of the proposed defense. (Citation omitted.) Here, the Court noted, Giovanni explained that the proposed defense, and the relevance of the requested information, was a potential suppression motion that would assert "(The arresting officers) wrote false information in their police report to justify their detention and pat[-]down of Giovanni [and] [w]ithout the false information, the officers [would] not have been justified in detaining and patting down Giovanni."

The Appellate Court concluded that "(B)ecause the officers had probable cause to detain and search Giovanni based on uncontested facts and independent of the alleged falsehoods as to Giovanni's physical ... dishevelment and statements of gang affiliation, the trial court correctly ruled the materials sought by Giovanni's Pitchess motion were irrelevant to the proposed defense. Therefore his motion did not demonstrate good cause for an in camera review of the confidential records."

O'Connell v. City of Stockton, 41 Cal.4th 1061 (Cal. 2007)

Kendra O'Connell filed a taxpayer action against the City of Stockton challenging the constitutionality of a City ordinance labeled "Seizure and Forfeiture of Nuisance Vehicles," seeking to enjoin the City's enforcement of the ordinance. The trial court sustained the City's demurrer to O'Connell's complaint, allowing leave to amend her complaint. When O'Connell did not amend, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit.

On appeal , the Appellate Court reversed , holding the forfeiture ordinance violated procedural due process because it failed to provide for a reasonably prompt post-seizure probable cause hearing on the City's right to hold a vehicle pending its forfeiture. The Court of Appeal also held that the forfeiture ordinance was preempted by specific state law provisions governing vehicle forfeiture. This conclusion conflicted with Horton v. City of Oakland (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 580 , in which a different Court of Appeal held that a vehicle forfeiture ordinance enacted by the City of Oakland , and similar to the one at issue here, was not preempted by state law. The California Supreme Court granted review to resolve the conflict.

In the past the Supreme Court articulated the following principles on state law preemption of local ordinances. "Under article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, '[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general [state] laws.' [ ¶ ] 'If otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void.' [Citations.] [ ¶ ] 'A conflict exists if the local legislation " ' duplicates , contradicts , or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication. [Citations.] ' "

The Supreme Court point out that Vehicle Code section 21 precludes local regulation of "matters covered" by the Vehicle Code, absent express legislative authorization. The use of vehicles in soliciting prostitution is a matter that the Vehicle Code covers in section 22659.5, which establishes a five-year pilot program under which cities and counties may treat as a public nuisance any vehicle used in soliciting prostitution, but does not allow for forfeiture of the vehicle. There being no express legislative authorization for any other form of local regulation of the matter covered by Vehicle Code section 22659.5, Vehicle Code section 21 precludes an ordinance like the City's, which seeks to regulate vehicle use in soliciting prostitution by requiring forfeiture of the vehicle. Under Vehicle Code section 21, therefore, the City's ordinance is expressly preempted by state law.

The Supreme Court opined that the illicit commercial activities -- prostitution and trafficking in controlled substances -- that were the focus of the City's vehicle forfeiture ordinance are matters of statewide concern that our Legislature has comprehensively addressed through various provisions of this state's Penal and Vehicle Codes, leaving no room for further regulation at the local level.