Case Summaries
May 2007

A Public Agency Is Authorized To Seek Disclosure Of Public Records
In Possession Of Another Public Agency.

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY (CITY OF LONG BEACH et al.,) 2007 DAR 8181,
151 Cal.App. 4th 759; 60 Cal.Rptr. 3d 445; 2007 Cal.App. LEXIS 879.

LAUSD wanted to build a public high school on approximately 14 acres within the City of Long Beach, at its western boundary, even though the proposed school would serve students residing in the City of Carson. The property currently is used for industrial purposes. Because the City expected that the school would have an impact on traffic, fire, and police services in its neighborhoods, City Attorney Shannon requested by letter copies of certain public records relating to the construction project. The request cited the California Public Records Act (CPRA) and asked for the production of 40 categories of documents, including all correspondence between LAUSD and appointed and elected officials of the City of Carson relating to site selection, location, and construction of the proposed high school, as well as copies of all projected busing patterns and busing studies related to the project.

LAUSD acknowledged that the records being sought were public records under the CPRA, but refused to produce them stating, “we are unable to make those records available because this request is . . . from a government agency, as opposed to a member of the public . . . .” LAUSD asserted that the CPRA did not confer local agencies or their officers (such as City Attorney Shannon) the right to inspect public records as they were not “persons” or “members of the public” under the Act.

The City of Long Beach filed a verified petition in the Superior Court for access to public records seeking an order to direct LAUSD to turn over the requested documents. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the petition and directed LAUSD to produce the requested documents.

The Court of Appeal pointed out that the ultimate purpose of the CPRA is to encourage full disclosure and openness in governmental affairs. Thus, one governmental entity should not hesitate to provide public records to another governmental entity. The Court concluded that the City was a “person” entitled to request documents from another governmental entity is the only rational and reasonable interpretation of the statute.

The Court opined that it’s task was to select the construction that comports most closely with the Legislature’s apparent intent, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the statutes’ general purpose, and to avoid a construction that would lead to unreasonable, impractical, or arbitrary results. 

The Court acknowledged that the statutory scheme was not a model of clarity, when applied to the factual situation before it, pointing out that it would lead to an absurd would result if it were to strictly construe sections 6252 and 6253 to preclude the City from obtaining documents from LAUSD.  Lastly the Court pointed out that LAUSD offered no public policy sufficiently strong to justify precluding one governmental agency from obtaining the public records maintained by another.

O’DEA v. MICHAEL BUNNELL et al., 2007 DAR 7537,  151 Cal.App.4th 214;
59 Cal.Rptr. 3d 684; 2007 Cal.App. LEXIS 837.

O’Dea, a Correctional Officer at Folsom State Prison, was injured while quelling a fight between rival prison gangs on April 8, 2002. In the months prior to the fight, the prison had been on lockdown because of a January riot in which the Northern Hispanic prison gang attacked the Southern Hispanic prison gang.

O’Dea , who was retired medically, filed an action alleging that he was deprived of his liberty interests. The trial court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion.

The California Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial courts grant of summary judgment for the defendants. The Court held that defendants, Michael Bunnell (an associate warden at Folsom State Prison), Oliver Acuna (a captain at Folsom State Prison), and Alan Baber (a lieutenant at Folsom State Prison) did not restrain O’Dea’s ability to act on his own behalf, even if they orchestrated the fight as alleged.  While their acts arguably increased the danger to the officer, they did not violate the due process clause.

GARY BLANKENHORN, v. CITY OF ORANGE, et al., 2007 DAR 6484 (9th Cir.).

Police officers from the City of Orange found Gary Blankenhorn, a known gang member, at a shopping mall where, six months before, he had been evicted and permanently banned from entering again. The officers arrested Blankenhorn on suspicion of trespass, and he was later charged with disturbing the peace, trespass, and three counts of resisting arrest. The prosecutor also added a gang related enhancement charge. After Blankenhorn had spent three months in jail, all charges were dropped and he was released. Blankenhorn then brought this civil rights suit against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution; and under California state law for false imprisonment, negligence, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Blankenhorn alleged that the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest him and that they used unreasonable force during the arrest by gang-tackling him, punching him, and using hobble restraints. He also sought damages from the City and Chief Andy Romero on theories of municipal and supervisorial liability. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of Blankenhorn’s causes of action, and
Blankenhorn timely appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit AFFIRMED the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the City on Blankenhorn’s municipal liability claim, and AFFIRMED the grant of summary judgment for Officers Gray, Nguyen, Ross, and South on Blankenhorn’s unlawful arrest claim. The Court REVERSED the grant of summary judgment for Officers Gray, Nguyen, Ross, South, and Kayano on Blankenhorn’s excessive force claims; for Officers Nguyen, Ross, and South on his malicious prosecution claim; and for Chief Romero on his supervisorial liability claim. The Court also REVERSED the grant of summary judgment for Defendants on all of Blankenhorn’s state law claims, except the false arrest claim, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with it’s opinion.

The majority of the Court noted that Blankenhorn had been issued a “Notice Forbidding Trespass” stating:“You are hereby notified that you are FORBIDDEN TO TRESPASS or enter upon my lands or buildings thereof . . . Failure to comply with this NOTICE shall result in your prosecution for TRESPASSING.”

The Court addressing the “use of force”, which was video taped, opined that a rational jury — drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged — could conclude the gang tackle used by the officers was unreasonable under the circumstances, and violated Blankenhorn’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the officers’ actions in making the arrest could reasonably be considered “provocative.” The arresting officers gave no warning that they were going to arrest Blankenhorn before gang-tackling him and later applying hobble restraints. 

The Court held that the state of the law was “clearly established” at the time of  Blankenhorn’s arrest and gave the arresting officers sufficiently fair notice that their conduct could have been unconstitutional.

The Ninth Circuit held that Chief Romero’s liability as supervisor depends upon whether he “ ‘set in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts by others, which he knew or reasonably should have known, would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.’ ”  To that end the Court noted that Blankenhorn presented evidence that Chief Romero approved Nguyen’s personnel evaluations despite three complaints of excessive force having been lodged against him. Nguyen’s evaluations also include several citizen commendations.

In addition to the approved evaluations, Blankenhorn presented expert testimony from Roger Clark (“Clark”), a former sergeant and lieutenant with twenty-seven years of experience in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. Clark’s opinion was that the Department’s discipline of Nguyen in all three matters was insufficient. Clark opined that discipline for the first complaint “should have included a re-training component and a period of monitoring to make this effective discipline and for deterrence.” For the second, Clark said Nguyen should have been fired. For the last complaint, Clark said that the “imposition of a written reprimand was tantamount to no discipline.”

The Court concluded that while Chief Romero did not personally dismiss complaints against Nguyen, he did approve Nguyen’s personnel evaluations despite repeated and serious complaints against him for use of excessive force. That approval, together with the expert testimony regarding the ineffectiveness of Nguyen’s discipline for those complaints, could lead a rational fact finder to conclude that Romero knowingly condoned and ratified actions by Nguyen that he reasonably should have known would cause constitutional injuries like the ones Blankenhorn may have suffered. Another genuine issue of material fact exists. Accordingly, summary judgment for Chief Romero on this issue was improper.