Required Domestic Violence Training
Is Not A State-Mandated Reimbursable Program
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES, (2003) 110 Cal.
App. 4th 1176
An administrative mandamus proceeding was commenced by LA County on a claim filed with and
denied by the Commission on State Mandates, for costs incurred pursuant to PC section 13519. The
trial court found that California Constitution article XIII B, section 6, required the state to reimburse
the County for domestic violence training. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, reversed, holding that merely by adding a course requirement to POST's certification, the
state had not shifted, from itself, the cost of a program previously administered and funded by the
state.
The Appellate Court pointed out that Article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution
provides: "Whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level
of service on any local government, the state shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse such
local government for the costs of such program or increased level of service ... ."
The Appellate Court rejected the county's argument that the domestic violence training constituted
a state-mandated reimbursable program because it (1) was mandatory, while the POST certification
training was optional; and (2) the only way local agencies could avoid the costs of the new program
would be to redirect their efforts from the training they were already providing as part of POST
training, thereby losing flexibility to design programs to suit their own needs.
The Appellate Court noted that the purpose of Constitution article XIII B, section 6 was to avoid
governmental programs from being forced on localities by the state. The Appellate Court found that,
in this case, the legislation did not mandate a "higher level of service."
The Appellate Court agreed that POST certification was, for all practical purposes, not a "voluntary"
program and therefore the County must, in order to comply with section 13519, add domestic
violence training to its curriculum. The Appellate Court commented that POST training and
certification was ongoing and extensive, and local law enforcement agencies may chose from a menu
of course offerings to fulfill the 24-hour requirement.
The Appellate Court added that the loss of "flexibility" does not, in and of itself, require the County
to expend funds that previously had been expended on the POST program by the State. Instead
"[t]he purpose for which state subvention of funds was created, to protect local agencies from
having the state transfer its cost of government from itself to the local level, is therefore not brought
into play" by a directive that POST certified studies include domestic violence training.
How does this affect your agency? Departments may be required to make some
hard choices in what curricula officers are going to be offered during their on going
training certification programs. Agencies should, if they haven't already, be
developing individualized training programs for each officer, designed to fit within
established POST/STC reimbursements and the department budgetary restraints.
Prosecutor Is Prohibited From Public Disclose Of
Information Contained In Police Personnel File
ALEX FAGAN, JR., et al. , v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY, (2003)
111 Cal. App. 4th 607
Off-duty San Francisco police officers, Alex Fagan, Jr., Matthew Tonsing and David Lee, were
ordered, by Internal Affairs to provide urine samples to the Police Department's Management
Control Division after being detained following a street fight. The results of the urinalysis tests were
placed in the officer's personnel files. A grand jury subsequently returned indictments against the
officers charging them with felony assault and battery. The urinalysis results were not introduced into
evidence in those proceedings.
Following disclosure that the district attorney had obtained the urinalysis results from the officers'
personnel files, the superior court, on the officers' motion, issued a protective order precluding
public dissemination of those results. Subsequently the officers also requested an order precluding
the district attorney from releasing the urinalysis results, on the grounds that those results were likely
inadmissible and that release of them would prejudice their rights to a fair trial. The superior court
denied the officers' motion, and dissolved its protective order.
The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, stayed the superior court's order unsealing
the urinalysis results, thereby reinstating the interim protective order. The Court held that, although
the district attorney properly obtained the results of the officers' urinalysis tests under the provisions
of PC § 832.7(a), those results may not be publicly disclosed or disseminated absent compliance with
Evidence Code § 1043.
The Appellate Court pointed out that the urinalysis tests were conducted as part of an administrative
investigation, and the results placed in the officer's confidential peace officer personnel files. The
officers were not under arrest when the tests were administered, and the tests were not administered
pursuant to driving under the influence statutes or implied consent laws. Nor were they evidence
obtained by a search, with or without a warrant, as part of a criminal investigation. Because the
urinalysis test results were contained in police investigative files, and the files of the district attorney,
they were not subject to disclosure under the California Public Records Act.
The Appellate Court stated that since the test results were not presented as evidence to the grand
jury, the arguments of the People and media concerning public disclosure of the blood alcohol results
of members of the public arrested for driving under the influence were inapposite, and the arguments
of media concerning public access to court hearings and court records was premature.
How does this affect your agency? This case restates the conclusion that the
exception contained in PC § 832.7 affords the district attorney the ability to review
confidential peace officer personnel files when investigating police misconduct,
without notice to the individuals involved. At the same time, however, the district
attorney is required to maintain the of the files as confidential, absent judicial review
of the relevance of the information to a criminal or civil action. Where the exception
afforded the district attorney by PC § 832.7(a) is inapplicable, he must proceed
according to the provisions of Evidence Code § 1043.
POPBRA Establishes Statute of
Limitations For Discharge
Of Peace Officer
JOHNNY JACKSON v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, (2003) 111 Cal. App. 4th 899
Johnny Jackson worked as an LAPD officer with partner Christian Shaw. Jackson made statements
to Shaw threatening injury to other officers and harm to the West Valley police station, which Shaw
brought to a supervisors attention. Shaw also stated that Jackson plotted to kill officers if they came
to his house or stopped him on the street, and had a list of 10 officers he would "take out." Jackson's
plan was to use an assault rifle he kept in his locker to kill officers at the station. The supervisor,
in turn, notified an internal affairs supervisor.
More than one year later, the chief of police issued an administrative complaint against Jackson
alleging three counts of misconduct. In a hearing conducted by the LAPD Board of Rights, Jackson
argued that as to the three counts, the one-year statue of limitations of Government Code § 3304 (d)
barred the Department from filing the administrative complaint. The Board rejected this argument.
Six months later the Board found Jackson guilty of all counts and recommended termination. The
chief of police terminated Jackson a month later.
Jackson filed a petition for peremptory writ of mandate and a claim for ancillary damages against
the City and Chief, claiming that the investigation was not completed within one year of discovery
and thus was barred by the Los Angeles City Charter and GC § 3304(d). The trial court denied
Jackson's petition.
The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reversed, holding that GC § 3304(d),
as implemented by the police department's own administrative order, establishes the statue of
limitations and barred the city's administrative complaint.
The Appellate Court noted that the limitations statues relied on by the city and Jackson both establish
a one-year limitations period, however, differed in defining when the limitations period commenced.
The Appellate Court rejected the City argument that the limitations period under the City Charter,
which does not begin to run until the matter is reported to the chief of police, was controlling.
The Appellate Court pointed out that as a matter of statewide concern, the Bill of Rights Act prevails
over the Los Angeles City Charter. The Appellate Court concluded that in matters of statewide
concern, applicable general state laws govern charter cities regardless of their charter provisions.
How does this affect your agency? Simply stated, the Peace Officer's Procedural
Bill of Rights Act overrides any contrary provision of a City Charter or other rule,
regulation, policy or procedure adopted by the local governing body. The Act
requires that an investigation can be completed, and within one year of a supervisor
discovery the alleged misconduct.
|
