HASTINGS v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, (2003) 110 Cal. App. 4th 963, Cal. Rptr. 3d 329

Hastings applied for, and was given a conditional offer of employment for the position of correctional officer, and commenced the six-week training course at the Academy. After two-weeks he suffered knee injuries while running and was unable to complete the course. The cause of the injuries was due to a degenerative joint disease in both knees and was determined to be a permanent condition. The treating physician for Hastings released him for any type of work, other than as a correctional peace officer cadet. CDC determined that Hastings's permanent knee injuries precluded him from performing the essential duties of a correctional officer and rejected him from probation.

Hastings filed suit alleging unlawful disability discrimination and retaliation. The trial court granted CDC's summary judgment motion, concluding Hastings was unable to establish a prima facie element of his claim because he could not show that he was qualified to be hired as a correctional officer.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District (Sac) affirmed the trial court finding that the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), read in harmony with the civil service laws, requires accommodation only to a position within the same civil service classification for which the employee applied.

The Court pointed out that to establish a prima facie case for discrimination under the FEHA, Hastings had to prove he was qualified for the position for which he sought an accommodation. The Court noted that Hastings was given a conditional offer of appointment as a correctional officer candidate and placed on probation. During his probationary term, he suffered permanent knee injuries that resulted in his failure to complete the prerequisite training and also made it impossible for him to perform the essential functions of the position for which he was hired. Therefore, even if Hastings was qualified for the position at the time he was given a conditional offer of employment, he failed to satisfy the prerequisites for permanent appointment to that position.

The Court stated that entitlement to reassignment to another position, as a reasonable accommodation, for Hastings turned on his employment classification. CDC did not hire Hastings as a data processor, or as an employee in its general workforce, but as a correctional officer and he never demonstrated that he was qualified for the position. Under these circumstances Hastings was not entitled to reassignment to another position with different qualifications within CDC.

The Court concluded that, as a result of his disability, Hastings lacked sufficient physical strength, endurance and mobility to perform the essential functions of a correctional officer. Any position which he was capable of performing would involve substantially different qualifications and tests of fitness, placing the position sought in a different class. Hastings's entitlement to such a position would come only by way of a competitive civil service examination process.

How does this affect your agency? Agencies that hire applicants as law enforcement trainees, who are then paid while attending the academy, should insure that the "Conditional Job Offer" extended to the applicants have a proviso that applicants must successfully complete the training program and be able to perform the essential job elements of the position for which the applicant has applied.

GONZALEZ, Jr. v. SPENCER, et al. & CO. OF LOS ANGLES, (2003) 336 F. 3d 832

A private sector attorney, defending the County of Los Angeles, accessed Gonzalez's juvenile court file without notifying him and obtaining authorization from the juvenile court, as required by WIC § 827(a)(1)(M) and California Rule of Court 1423(b). The attorney used confidential records from the file to cross examine Gonzalez during his deposition in his lawsuit against the County. Alleging a violation of his rights, Gonzalez brought suit against the attorney, the law firm and the County. The district court dismissed Gonzalez's claim for damages, declaratory and injunctive relief. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the damages claims.

The Ninth Circuit stated that the attorney was not considered "court personnel" for purposes of WIC § 827(a)(1)(A). She was not a court employee and did not perform functions routinely performed by court employees. She was an outside service provider, retained to represent the County with respect to its pecuniary interests. Therefore, the attorney had to get court permission before inspecting Gonzalez's file. The Ninth Circuit further held that the attorney was not entitled to qualified immunity in as much as she was a private party, not a government employee.

How does this affect your agency? When a private law firm is retained to represent an agency in a civil matter, in order to access to juvenile records, even where those records may be in possession of the defendant agency, the procedures contained in the WIC and California Rules of Court must be followed in order to avoid unnecessary liability exposure.

MENA v. CITY OF SIMI VALLEY, et al., (2003) 332 F. 3d 1255

Officers from the Simi Valley Police Department SWAT team executed a valid search warrant, believing their primary suspect, Raymond Romero, was residing in the house. The search was part of the investigation of a gang related drive by shooting. Iris Mena was a resident in the house which was owned by her father. The officers forcibly entered the residence and observed rooms locked with padlocks.

Officers then proceeded to force entry into the locked rooms, including the bedroom in which Iris Mena was sleeping. Officers wearing SWAT team paraphernalia found Iris Mena in bed and, pointing a submachine gun at her head, turned her over onto her stomach and handcuffed her. After searching her person and her room, Iris Mena was led - barefoot and still wearing her pajamas - outside through the rain to a cold garage. Although she was absolutely compliant, the officers detained Iris Mena in handcuffs for approximately two to three hours. An immigration officer who had joined the police on the search asked Iris Mena questions concerning her citizenship status. Upon learning from Iris Mena that her citizenship documentation was in her purse, a police officer searched her purse without her consent.

Mena brought suit alleging civil rights violations. The district court denied the officer's summary judgment motion holding that, because "a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the warrant and/or its execution was "over broad," and "a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Mena's detention was unreasonable," the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The jury returned a verdict finding that Officers Muehler and Brill violated Mena's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure by detaining her with unreasonable excessive force and for a longer period than was reasonable, finding each officer personally liable.

The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit affirmed, except as to the claim that the warrant was over broad on its face.

Following the United States Supreme Court's guidelines in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Ninth Circuit noted that the officers were investigating a serious crime and were authorized under a warrant to search the Mena home and seize property in relation to their investigation. Iris Mena, however, was not the subject of this investigation and it was clear that Iris Mena posed no "immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others." Iris Mena did not actively resist arrest or attempt to flee, she was unarmed, docile, and cooperative in every respect.

The Ninth Circuit observed that although searches of Mena's person and room produced no evidence of gang membership or contraband, and well armed SWAT team officers secured the house in a matter of minutes, the officers handcuffed Iris Mena and kept her in handcuffs for two to three hours. The officers, according to the Ninth Circuit, should have released her from the handcuffs when it became clear that she posed no immediate threat and did not resist arrest . Moreover, because Iris Mena was not a suspect, the police should not have subjected her to any of the heightened security measures. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Mena's detention was objectively unreasonable and "unnecessary ... degrading and prolonged."

The Ninth Circuit also noted that the officers unduly invaded Mena's privacy by inquiring unnecessarily into her citizenship status. The Court concluded that the officers simply did not have the particularized reasonable suspicion, the Fourth Amendment requires, to justify questioning Iris Mena regarding her citizenship status or searching her purse for immigration documentation without her consent.

The Ninth Circuit also held that the right to be free from the type of search was clearly established at the time of the search, and that any reasonable officer would have known that the conduct Iris Mena suffered was unlawful.

How does this affect your agency? Officers executing arrest and/or search warrants must be able to justify their actions, specifically, in order to show the reasonableness of the actions taken. The use of "officer safety", "feared for our safety," etc., as stand alone language to justify actions, without detailed facts to support why the actions were necessary and reasonable, only enhances the chances of a jury and/or court engaging in speculation. Reports must be well written, chronological and comprehensive in order to protect an officer's "qualified immunity" defense.