Stevens v. California Department of Corrections, 107 Cal. App. 4th 285; 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19

Sgt. Keeley Stevens submitted request for a one-week vacation to Capt. Morris to spend Christmas with his parents. The request stated that Sgt. Stevens' family resided in the State of Michigan and that the health of both parents had deteriorated significantly during the past year, and that Sgt. Stevens anticipated each could pass away in the near future. Capt. Morris returned the request a few days later having handwritten a note on it that there were no open vacation slots for the requested week. Four months later Sgt. Stevens filed a grievance and subsequently filed suit, alleging the Department had violated the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) by denying his request for family leave.

The trial court granted DOC's motion for summary judgment, concluding that "[n]o reasonable employer ... would think plaintiff's request for vacation triggered a duty to notify plaintiff of his CFRA rights."

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District (Sacramento) affirmed, holding that the vacation request was insufficient as a matter of law to notify the Department that Sgt. Stevens sought leave to care for his parents in accordance with the CFRA.

The Appellate Court pointed out that the California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 7297.4, subdivision (a)(1), describes the notice requirements of a reasonable request for CFRA leave as follows:

"An employee shall provide at least verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs CFRA-qualifying leave, and the anticipated timing and duration of the leave. The employee need not expressly assert rights under CFRA or FMLA, or even mention CFRA or FMLA, to meet the notice requirement; however, the employee must state the reason the leave is needed, such as, for example, the expected birth of a child or for medical treatment. The employer should inquire further of the employee if it is necessary to have more information about whether CFRA leave is being sought by the employee and obtain the necessary details of the leave to be taken."

The Court disagreed with Sgt. Stevens' claim that his "writing was sufficient that a reasonable employer would at least have reason to question what type of leave (he) was requesting and entitled to." The Court noted that in Sgt. Stevens case the relevant CFRA-qualifying leave was "[l]eave to care for a parent ... who has a serious health condition."

The Court concluded that Stevens's request gave no hint of a desire to care for his parents, instead, he asked for one week of vacation "to spend the Christmas [h]oliday with [his] family." That simply advised the Department that he sought vacation time, and the fact that his request also noted that his parents' health had deteriorated significantly did not reasonably alert the Department to an intent to care for his parents, rather than to visit them.

How does this affect your agency? Supervisors, managers, and administrators must become familiar with all provisions of the California Family Rights Act, as well as the Family Medical Leave Act, and departments should make certain that the provisions of both are posted, as required, in conspicuous places most frequented by employees. Training all employees, especially decision makers, should minimize misunderstanding between labor and management.

Teter v. City of Newport Beach, 30 Cal. 4th 446; 696 P. 3d 1225; 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139

Craig Teter was arrested and booked into the City jail for violation of PC § 647(f), and was scheduled to be released without charges being filed. Another prisoner was placed in the cell where Teter was sleeping and sometime prior to Teter's release time, severely beat him, resulting in a concussion and a broken eye socket. Teter filed suit and the trial court disagreed with the city's contention that the Government Code confirmed immunity for an injury to a prisoner. The jury returned a verdict for Teter in the amount of $175, 006.89. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding Teter was a detainee in civil protective custody and not a prisoner within the meaning of Government Code § 844.6(a)(2), and that the jail officer's decision to place the other prisoner in Teter's cell was a ministerial act not entitled to immunity under Government Code § 820.2.

The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that Teter was a prisoner and that the City could claim Government Code § 844.6(a)(2) immunity.

The Supreme Court noted that Teter was not placed in civil protective custody pursuant to Penal Code § 647(g), in as much as the arresting officer was not "reasonably able to place Teter in a civil detoxification facility as no facility was available.

The Supreme Court concluded by paraphrasing Armondo v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1179, "we hold that an arrest for Penal Code section 647(f), valid when made, remains a valid arrest for the purposes of Government Code section 844.6(a)(2), even though the person arrested is subsequently released pursuant to Penal Code section 849(b) and issued a certificate pursuant to Penal Code section 851.6, describing the action as a detention."

How does this affect your agency? There is no need for department's to change the way business is conducted regarding the arrest of persons pursuant to PC § 647(f), and subsequent release under PC § 849(b). Agencies are not responsible for injuries suffered at the hands of other prisoners, unless there is a deliberate indifference on the part of jail personnel in placing known violent persons in a cell with a section 647(f) detainee.

Brant v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles Co., 108 Cal. App. 4th 100; 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783

Jerry Brant was a criminal defendant charged with possession of a controlled substance. He moved for discovery from the personnel files of the two arresting police officers, under Evidence Code section 1043, contending that the officers lied in their police report. Brant challenged the officers' account of the detention, search and manner in which his confession was obtained by providing his own version of the events, making the officers' truthfulness material to the issues in the case. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate division of superior court summarily denied Brant's petition for a writ of mandate, alleging that the trial court erred in denying his discovery motion.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District reversed, holding that Brant satisfied the criteria for discovery under Evidence Code § 1043, subdivision (b), and was entitled to an in camera hearing and a determination of relevance under the provisions of § 1045.

The Appellate Court observed that it was evident the trial court abused its discretion in this case. Instead of considering counsel's declaration in light of established principles the trial court ruled that Brant failed to personally file a declaration or meet his "high burden," and that the officers had discretion to stop Brant. Each of these conclusions, the Appellate Court pointed out, runs contrary to the now well-established principles for evaluating Pitchess motions.

The Court noted that Brant's motion disclosed that his defense was that the arresting officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him and that his confession was obtained without advising him of Miranda rights. To support that theory, Brant's counsel stated in his declaration that the arresting officers lied that Brant's car stereo was loud in order to stop him. Rather, the loud music was coming from nearby nightclubs. Counsel also described how Brant was placed in custody, questioned and confessed without an advisement of his rights. In short Brant challenged the officers' account of the detention, search and manner in which his confession was obtained by providing his own version of the events, thereby making the officers' truthfulness material to the issues in the case.

The Appellate Court concluded that Pitchess discovery was appropriate when a defendant seeks information to assist in a motion to suppress.

How does this affect your agency? This holding reaffirms that when an officer's truthfulness become an issue, courts will order discovery of information from officer's personnel files.

People v. Jordan, 108 Cal. App. 4th 349, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434

Paul Jordan was arrested by Long Beach Police Detectives and was convicted of possession for sale of cocaine base. Jordan contended the People's failure to provide information that could have been used to impeach a detective's rebuttal testimony violated Brady v. Maryland.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed, and denied Jordan's petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court rejected Jordan's claim that the People have a constitutional obligation to disclose complaints about police officer misconduct where the only evidence of such misconduct was defense testimony at an unrelated criminal trial.

The Court noted that a prosecutor's duty under Brady, to disclose material exculpatory evidence, applied to evidence the prosecutor, or the prosecution team, knowingly possesses or has the right to possess. The prosecution team includes both investigative and prosecutorial agencies and personnel. The prosecution must disclose evidence that is actually or constructively in its possession or accessible to it.

The Appellate Court also noted that the constitutional duty that requires prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant under Brady was independent from the statutory duty to provide discovery under Penal Code § 1054.1 (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d, 378). Thus, evidence that is material under Brady must be disclosed to the defense, notwithstanding any failure of the defense to enforce its statutory right to discovery.

The Court pointed out that in order to obtain discovery of citizen complaints, the People, as well as the defendant, must comply with the statutory requirements for disclosure of citizen complaints (Alford v. Superior Court, (2003) 29 Cal.4th, 1046).

However, the Court opined that the rule proposed by Jordan would require the People to catalog the testimony of every witness called by the defense at every criminal trial in the county, cull from that testimony complaints about peace officers and disclose those complaints to the defense whenever the People called the peace officer as a witness at another trial. The Court stated that "the prosecution has no general duty to seek out, obtain, and disclose all evidence that might be beneficial to the defense." (In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 135).

The Court observed that it did not appear that a claim of peace officer misconduct, asserted only at an unrelated criminal trial by a defendant trying to avoid criminal liability, constitutes favorable evidence within the meaning of Brady. Defense attacks upon the integrity of a police officer are a common feature of criminal trials. Given that the proponent of the evidence has a strong incentive to avoid conviction, such complaints do not immediately command respect as trustworthy or indicate actual misconduct on the part of the officer. The lack of trustworthiness in defense complaints about peace officers, advanced only at an unrelated trial, is highlighted by comparing such complaints with citizen complaints of officer misconduct which the officer's employer has sustained as true.

The Court pointed to Justice Moreno's dissent in City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 28) observed that sustained citizen complaints of officer misconduct likely involve moral turpitude and thus contain admissible impeachment evidence under People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 295-297). Accordingly, such complaints should be disclosed under Brady. The Appellate Court concluded that a similar conclusion cannot be reached with respect to complaints of the type Jordan asserts should have been disclosed here.

How does this affect your agency? When issues are raised concerning Brady material and/or impeachment evidence under Wheeler, the prosecutor must make the ultimate decision on what is, or is not, going to be released to the defendant. Where a Pitchess Motion is at issue, it is the trial judge who will make the in-camera decision of what is to be released. In either case there is a process for appellate review should a controversy ensue. Departments should immediately involve counsel when a request for information contained in an employee's personnel file has been received.