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Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 3676; 123 S. Ct. 1887
The Bishop Paiute Gaming Corporation, which operates and manages the Paiute Palace Casino
(Casino) is owned and chartered by the Bishop Paiute Tribe in California. The Inyo County District
Attorney (DA) requested the employment records of three Casino employees who were under
investigation for welfare fraud from the Casino. The Casino refused citing their privacy policy.
The DA "obtained and executed a search warrant" for the records of the three employees and six
other employees. The Tribe "offered to accept as evidence of consent a redacted copy of the last
page of each employee's signed welfare application" and the DA refused. The Tribe filed suit against
the DA and the Sheriff and County asserting federal question jurisdiction and seeking relief under
42 U.S.C. section 1983.
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the Tribe could not sue under section 1983 "to vindicate the
sovereign right to self-government." The Court stated that "Section 1983 was designed to secure
private rights against government encroachment, not to advance a sovereign's prerogative to
withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation."
The Court also found that the Tribe made "no allegation that the County lacked probable cause or
that the warrant was otherwise defective." Further the Tribe failed to "explain . . . what prescription
of federal common law enables a tribe to maintain an action for declaratory and injunctive relief
establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal processes."
HOW THIS EFFECTS YOUR AGENCY
The Supreme Court has left unanswered the fundamental question of whether, and through what
means, state and local law enforcement in Public Law 280 states, such as California, can enforce
state laws and legal processes on tribal lands and/or against tribal business enterprises, such as
casinos.
While it appears to be lawful and necessary for the police to do so, and while we now know that such
enforcement efforts cannot be challenged by a tribe through a §1983 action, it still cannot be said
with absolute certainty that there is not some other basis of legal challenge by a tribe.
Therefore, great care and caution should be taken to ensure that proposed enforcement actions are,
where feasible, reviewed by both the concerned district attorney and legal counsel for the agency(1)
before action is taken; and that, whenever possible, prior to using legal processes such as search
warrants and subpoenas duces tecum, reasonable efforts be made at securing voluntary cooperation
of the concerned tribal officials.
Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
9560 (9th Cir.)
Plaintiff was pulled over by Manhattan Beach Police Officer Robert Schreiber for allegedly driving
erratically. Plaintiff showed Schreiber an expired driver's license to which an outstanding warrant
was attached. Plaintiff was arrested for violating California Vehicle Code section 12500 (prohibits
driving an automobile without a license) and taken to the police station, where he remained for
several hours. Plaintiff filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the traffic stop "violated
the Fourth Amendment because it was an unreasonable seizure; that he was targeted for a traffic stop
because of his race, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; that his arrest violated the Fourth
Amendment; that the officers conspired to deprive him of his civil rights; and the City should be held
liable for the officers' misdeeds as their supervisor."
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court that "an unlawful traffic stop, even if not racially
motivated, may give rise to a section 1983 violation." The Ninth Circuit, "accepting as true
Plaintiff's version of the facts, found that there was not reasonable suspicion for Schreiber to detain
plaintiff." The next question for the Court was "whether the right not to be stopped without
reasonable suspicion was clearly established (whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that
his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted)." The officer did not receive qualified
immunity with respect to the traffic stop.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, granting Schreiber's summary judgment
motion on the claim that the traffic stop was based on race. The Ninth Circuit found that plaintiff
failed to prove "that Schreiber acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was
intentional."
The Court further found that "detaining plaintiff to verify a warrant whose identifying information
matched him so closely is not an objectively unreasonable decision." Despite California Vehicle
Code section 12801.5(e) which prohibits arresting someone for being an unlicensed driver, the Court
concluded " that qualified immunity is nonetheless available bacause 'a reasonable officer could
have believed [plaintiff's detention for verification of the warrant] was lawful, in light of clearly
established law and the information [Schreiber] possessed."
HOW THIS EFFECTS YOUR AGENCY
Courts are increasingly scrutinizing officers articulation of facts justifying a lawful traffic stop. As
a result, officers in your agency should be "on the ready" to defend the reasonable suspicion they
assert as the basis for a traffic stop.
1. Remember that the district attorney is not legal counsel to the local agency nor to individual officers or deputies, and cannot
provide legal counsel on issues of civil liability
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