County of Riverside v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Riverside Sheriff's Association), 132 Cal. Rptr 2d 713; 2003 Cal. LEXIS 2426

The California Supreme Court in County of Riverside v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Riverside Sheriff's Association), ruled, on April 21, 2003 that the Legislature's attempt, via SB 402, to impose binding arbitration on cities and counties exceeded its authority as provided by Article 11 sections 1(b) and 11 of the California Constitution.

The case arose when compensation negotiations between Riverside County and the Riverside County Sheriff's Association reached an impasse. The Association requested the matter be submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 1229 et seq. (SB 402) and the County refused. The trial court ordered arbitration finding the matter was of statewide, rather than local, concern which authorized the legislature to act as it did. The County appealed and the Court of Appeal found SB 402 unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court agreed.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the position that the language of Article 11 section 11 is clear, the legislature cannot mandate that a city or county turn over municipal financial affairs (e.g., setting of salaries) to a private person (e.g., an arbitration panel). Such a legislative mandate usurps the role of elected officials.

HOW THIS EFFECTS YOUR DEPARTMENT

The California Supreme Court has made it clear, the legislature cannot impose binding arbitration on your city or county. However, this decision does not prohibit a city or county from voluntarily agreeing to binding arbitration. This issue can, and probably will, be presented for negotiation by the employees unions as MOU's expire. By agreeing to binding arbitration, you are forfeiting the procedural and substantive safeguards of the judicial process - there is no right of appeal and the decision of the arbitrator(s) is final.

Teter v. City of Newport Beach, 30 Cal. 4^th 446; 2003 Cal. LEXIS 2639

On April 28, 2003 the California Supreme Court decided that a city can claim immunity for jail injuries sustained by an arrestee who was subsequently released without charges. (Martin J. Mayer and Michael R. Capizzi, of the Law Offices of Jones & Mayer, filed an amicus brief on behalf of the California State Sheriffs' Association, California Police Chiefs Association and the California Peace Officers' Association.)

The plaintiff (Teter) was arrested and booked into the city jail for public intoxication. No detoxification facility was available and the city had a policy of releasing persons arrested (without charges) for public intoxication provided they met certain eligibility criterion. The morning following the plaintiffs arrest, but prior to his release, another prisoner was placed in the cell where the Plaintiff was sleeping. Plaintiff was subsequently beaten severely by the cell-mate. Plaintiff sued the city for negligence and the city defended citing Government Code section 844.6(a)(2) (injuries to a prisoner) and 820.2 (discretionary act immunity).

The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and an appellate court affirmed the judgement entered by the trial court. The California Supreme Court focused exclusively on the applicability of Cal. Gov't Code section 844.6(a)(2) which provides generally: a public entity is not liable for [a]n injury to any prisoner. Plaintiff had argued that he was not a prisoner but rather in civil protective custody pursuant to Penal Code 647(g). The appellate court agreed with plaintiff's argument. The Supreme Court, however, found that no civil detoxification facility was available, that plaintiff had been lawfully arrested and booked into the jail facility, and thus was a 'prisoner' as defined by Government Code section 844 when he was injured.

Both Plaintiff and the appellate court relied principally on Meyer v. City of Oakland, (1980) 107 Cal. App. 3d 770. The Supreme Court distinguished Meyer by finding that "unlike the City of Newport Beach, the City of Oakland had a civil detoxification facility. The supervising officer of the Oakland City jail knew that Mr. Meyer was being held in civil protective custody pursuant to section 647. . . ." Furthermore, the Supreme Court rejected the underlying premise of the Meyer opinion - that a 647(f) arrestee being held in jail pending transfer to a civil detoxification facility is not a prisoner for the purposes of section 844.6(a)(2).

HOW THIS EFFECTS YOUR AGENCY

If your department has a pattern, policy or practice of citing and releasing persons arrested for 647(f), or has a civil detoxification or treatment facility to which arrestees are transferred, we advise that those arrestees be kept isolated from other arrestees pending transfer or release. Teter appears to re-affirm the obligation on custodial facilities to segregate civil detainees from those charged with criminal offenses.

People v. Spence, 107 Cal. App. 4^th 1131

The California Court of Appeal-Third District addressed the issue of whether the "exclusionary rule should apply to a probation search conducted by police officers in reliance on a probation roster that, by design, omitted information concerning judicially imposed limitation on the authority to conduct a probation search."

On January 23, 1996, Woodland Police Officers conducted a probation search of defendant's residence based on information found in a probation roster. As part of defendant's probation, defendant consented to searches for stolen property only. This limitation was not present in the probation roster consulted by the officer. However the officers searched for and found narcotics, under the mistaken belief that his consent was without limitation.

The Court concluded that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply to the officers' search because "law enforcement did not fulfill its responsibility to supplement the information in the probation roster, such as having a court or probation employee examine the probation order." The Court also stated that requiring such redesign or supplementation of information, would have a "significant deterrent effect on the court, police and probation officials who would be put on notice that reliance upon the roster in its present form will result in the exclusion of evidence."

HOW THIS EFFECTS YOUR AGENCY

If your agency maintains a database of probationers within your jurisdiction, it is essential that the database (roster or other format) be complete with all conditions of probation. Continuous monitoring and updating of the information contained therein (including limitations on certain conditions) will better serve to equip your personnel with the information needed to monitor probationers within your jurisdiction.

Rawls v. Zamora, 107 Cal. App. 4^th 1110

Rawls, who advocated the right to bear arms and the granting of concealed weapon permits, sought to be a write-in candidate for election as the Santa Clara County Sheriff. However Government Code section 24004.3 requires that such a candidate possess law enforcement experience.

Rawls admitted that he did not have the necessary law enforcement experience but argued that Government Code section 24004.3 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendment ("by restricting the pool of sheriff candidates to law-enforcement personnel, section 24004.3 effectively excludes the civilian viewpoint from being heard").

The Court concluded that section 24004.3 was even-handedly and neutrally applied to all candidates and it does not "significantly impair access to the ballot." The Court also concluded that the "burden imposed by section 24004.3 on plaintiff's free speech is not severe."

HOW THIS EFFECTS YOUR AGENCY

Although this case may not effect your agency, its primary impact is upon candidates for sheriff in the State of California. It is now settled, such candidates must comply with Government Code section 24004.3.

People v. White, 107 Cal. App. 4^th 636 (April-2003)

An officer on patrol stopped defendant's car because he erroneously believed that only one Arizona license plate, and a tree -shaped air freshener hanging from the rearview mirror, constituted Vehicle Code violations. When the officer stopped the vehicle, he found five pounds of marijuana, glass pipes for smoking marijuana and over $9000.00 in cash.

The First Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal found that "Arizona, however, issues only one plate per vehicle, and we conclude that the officer's error of law, though made in good faith, cannot form the basis for a vehicle stop." In addition, the Court determined "that the evidence produced at the hearing on the defendants' motions to suppress failed to establish a reasonable basis for believing the air freshener reduced the driver's clear view."

The Court concluded the following:

Though we assume the officer acted in good faith, there is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for police who enforce a legal standard that does not exist. Creating a good faith exception here would run counter to the exclusionary rule's goal by removing an incentive for the police to know the law we entrust them to enforce.

HOW THIS EFFECTS YOUR AGENCY

Similar to the increased scrutiny of what constitutes reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop, this case illustrates yet another consideration for officers; a mistake in the law, even if made in good faith, will not serve to overcome a motion to suppress evidence filed by the defense.