PALMER'S
PITCHESS UPDATE
Prepared By: Greg P. Palmer
ANOTHER VERY GOOD PITCHESS DECISION
On March 27, 2003 the
Second Appellate District,
Division Two in Los Angeles
issued its decision on the denial of
a Pitchess motion in Warrick v.
Superior Court (City of Los
Angeles Police Department)(2003
Cal.App.Lexis 576). In this
decision for the first time a court
specifically attaches importance to
the phrase from Pitchess law, "plausible factual foundation," and
will be a very useful case in
opposing Pitchess motions in the
future.
Warrick was seen by two
Los Angeles police officers
standing against a wall looking at a
clear plastic baggie he held in his
left hand. The officers noted that
the baggie contained an off-white
substance that resembled cocaine.
They got out of the car and
Warrick began running on the
sidewalk. The officers chased him
and as he ran, Warrick discarded
numerous rocks that were later
determined to be cocaine. Warrick
stopped running and the two
officers took him into custody.
Forty-two rocks of cocaine were
recovered from the ground where
Warrick had discarded them. And
the police recovered a clear plastic
baggie from Warrick's left hand.
He was arrested and charged with
possession of cocaine for sale with
several enhancements being added
because of his prior record.
He filed a pre-trial Pitchess
discovery motion requesting
information from the personnel
records of the officers involved in
his arrest, and specifically
requested records of excessive
force, race bias, filing false police
reports and dishonesty. Warrick's counsel filed a
declaration on information and
belief stating, in part, that Warrick
ran when he was confronted by the
police because he had an
outstanding parole warrant, and
after he was apprehended, about 50
to 100 feet away from where the
pursuit began, he and the officers
heard a commotion behind them
and saw people pushing and
kicking and fighting each other
while picking up rocks from the
ground. He claimed that an officer
told the individuals to leave while
the other officers stayed with
Warrick and arrested him. The
officers then started picking up
rocks from the ground. After they
picked up a certain number, they
said to the crowd that they could
have the rest. The officers then
told Warrick that it must have been
he who threw these to the ground
and so they must have belonged to
him.
Warrick claimed that he did
not possess any rock cocaine when
he was seen by the police, did not
discard any away, and did not
possess cocaine for sale on the day
of his arrest. Instead, he was there
to buy cocaine from another person
who was at the scene when police
arrived, but who did not run away.
His claim was that it must have
been somebody else that threw
rock cocaine down at the scene, but
that it wasn't he and the officers
falsely claimed that they had seen
Warrick do it.
LAPD opposed the motion
citing, among other grounds, that
Warrick's factual scenario was
implausible and, therefore, did not
support any Pitchess discovery.
The trial court agreed with that and
denied the motion. Warrick filed a
writ which was initially denied and
then the California Supreme Court
issued an order requiring the Court
of Appeal to hear and determine
the matter.
After again analyzing the
Pitchess discovery scenario under
Evidence Code 1043, and again
acknowledging, as so many courts
have in the past, the officers just
claim to confidentiality in their
personnel files, the Appellate
Court analyzed whether defense
counsel had stated good cause for
discovery of information from the
officers' files.
The court noted that
Warrick's factual scenario
admitted everything in the police
report was true except that he had
the cocaine when he was observed
by the officers and that he was the
person who threw the forty-two
rocks onto the ground. Looking at
the first phrase in the good cause
Pitchess analysis, the court said
that Warrick's version of the
events was sufficiently specific to
constitute a "specific factual
scenario" as that phrase is used in
many Pitchess decisions. The
problem came when the court
analyzed the second prong of the
Pitchess good cause analysis;
whether Warrick had established a
"plausible factual foundation" supporting his desire for the
discovery. Warrick asserted the
police misconduct had been
alleged with sufficient plausibility.
However, the court disagreed with
that claim and agreed with the trial
court that Warrick's factual
scenario was implausible.
The court explained that
Warrick's factual scenario was
based on the assertion that he was
about to buy drugs and not sell
them when the police arrived.
Warrick states that he was standing
in back of a prospective seller
when the police arrived, but he
does not dispute a materially
inconsistent fact with that
contention. That materially
inconsistent fact was the total
funds he had on his person was
$2.75.
The court noted other facts
concerning his claim that added to
the implausibility of the scenario.
It noted that any person in
Warrick's vicinity when the police
arrived was out of harm's way
once the officers began running
after Warrick. Thus, it would have
been unreasonable for any other
person to discard forty-two rocks
of cocaine after the police had
passed, and it would have been
even more unreasonable to do so in
full view of other bystanders. It
also defied belief that a person
would have followed behind
Warrick and the pursuing police in
order to discard the cocaine in
Warrick's proximity in the middle
of the street. The court found that
on this record the trial court could
reasonably find that Warrick's
scenario was not objectively
plausible, i.e., that no reasonable
person would find it plausible.
The court found that "plausible" means "seemingly
true," "having an appearance of
truth or reason; seemingly worthy
of approval or acceptance;
credible; believable: a plausible
excuse; a plausible plot." "It
denotes a degree of reasonable
probability, a degree of apparent
credibility greater than mere
possibility." The court found that
Warrick's factual scenario did not
meet this standard. A
determination of plausibility is a
necessary element in the trial
court's evaluation of good cause.
The petition was denied
and the decision of the trial court in
denying the Pitchess motions was
upheld.
SO WHAT DO
WE DO NOW?
Utilize this case when you
can determine that a claim made by
a defendant in support of his
request for Pitchess discovery
contains defects when compared to
the facts recited in the police report
that make the claims made by the
defendant seeking discovery to be
hard to believe. Look for
improbability factors in the
defendant's statement of good
cause. If you can find enough of
them, as was found in this case,
you can argue this case for the
premise that the defense's
assertions are implausible, and
therefore, do not rise to the level of
a plausible factual scenario
supporting the discovery request.
Determine if the defense claim is
something that "has an appearance
of truth;" is "seemingly worthy of
approval;" and "credible." If it is
not and you can articulate the
implausibility, a court should deny
the motion
Many agency counsel
around the state have been
lamenting the fact that in some
jurisdictions individual defendants
and defense counsel were able to
obtain Pitchess motion discovery
of records of past dishonesty
simply by making a blanket
statement that everything in the
police report is not true and
denying everything in the police
happened. This has been
especially true where the case of
People v. Hustead was decided and
where that case has been followed.
Warrick analyzes People v.
Hustead and distinguishes it by
separating out the two elements of
good cause, specific factual
scenario and plausible factual
foundation as two separate
elements, both of which must be
demonstrated by the defense. For
those of you who have been
troubled by the granting of Pitchess
discovery on a general denial that
everything in the police report is
true under People v. Hustead, this
case should give you more
ammunition to argue that it is not
enough to make a simple general
denial of the facts in the police
report, but that more is required to
establish that plausible factual
foundation for the misconduct
alleged.
Be
sure to consult competent legal counsel before deciding how to proceed
on any matter to which these cases may be applicable.
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