PALMER'S
PITCHESS UPDATE
Prepared By: Greg P. Palmer
WELCOME SUPREME
COURT DECISION
ON THE LIMITS OF
PITCHESS TYPE DISCOVERY
The San Diego County
Public Defender's office was
routinely sharing with one another
information obtained from a
confidential police officer's
personnel files following discovery
obtained from a Pitchess motion.
Their ability to continue to do this
has been addressed by the
California Supreme Court in a case
involving the propriety of a trial
court issuing a protective order
which limits use of Pitchess type
information to only the case in
which the discovery was sought.
The Court of Appeal held (1) that a
protective order which limits the
use of such material to the case to
which it pertains is consistent with
the law and (2) that the prosecutor
is allowed contemporaneous
discovery of the same material as
the defense. The California
Supreme court granted review and
myself, along with Krista Jee of
our office, authored an amicus
brief on behalf of 79 California
cities, CPOA, CPCA, and CSSA.
We are pleased to announce that
the Supreme Court ruled in favor
of our position on the issue of the
limitation on the use of the
information to the case in which it
was sought. (Alford v. Superior
Court (People) (February 27, 2003)
2003 Cal. Lexis 1293.
Alford and another
individual were arrested on drug
charges. They contended the
arresting officers used excessive
force and made false statements in
their reports. A Pitchess motion
was granted, an in-camera review
of the records was held and
information from two incidents
was found relevant and was
ordered disclosed. The issue
concerning the protective order
prohibiting use of this information
to only the Alford case generated
the appeal.
PROTECTIVE ORDER
The controversy was based
upon the language of Evidence
Code § 1045(e). That subdivision
states that the court "shall order
that the records disclosed or
discovered shall not be used for
any purpose other than a court
proceeding pursuant to applicable
law. The defense argued the use of
the indefinite article, "a," in the
phrase . . . "a court proceeding . .
. " meant that Pitchess information,
once disclosed, could be used in
any court proceeding, not just the
case in which the discovery was
ordered. The Court of Appeal was
unpersuaded by the argument and
in a 6-1 decision the Supreme
Court was likewise unpersuaded.
The court acknowledged
the "peace officer's just claim to
confidentiality" and the
defendant's right to all information
pertinent to his defense. In
resolving those competing interests
the court called the Evidence Code
procedures to be a "veritable model
of clarity and balance." We argued
and the court agreed, finding the
defense interpretation of the phrase
"a court proceeding" meaning
[any] court proceeding would
defeat the purpose of the statute. It
was meant to ensure that use of the
material generated from a Pitchess
motion would be confined to that
case in which it was already shown
to be material to the subject matter
of the litigation. The entire phrase
analyzed from the statute is "a
court proceeding pursuant to
applicable law." The portion of the
phrase, pursuant to applicable law,
refers to the statutory Pitchess
scheme. Thus, without a Pitchess
motion being heard and granted,
Pitchess discovery is not allowed
in that case.
The protestations of the
public defender also did not
persuade the Supreme Court. They
argued that a protective order
preventing them from sharing
Pitchess information forces them to
needlessly file Pitchess motions in
subsequent cases and impedes their
ability to represent their clients.
The public defender failed to
identify any impediment to their
ability to represent their clients and
the statutory authority for Pitchess
discovery supercedes the general
rules of public defenders offices
about distribution of information
gained by them.(1)
PROSECUTORIAL ACCESS
A more sharply divided
court ruled that the prosecution is
not entitled to contemporaneous
access to Pitchess information
which is ordered disclosed to the
defense. The justices ruled 4-3
that the DA is entitled to notice of
the motion and the ability to
respond to questions from the trial
court about matters pertaining to
the motion. Beyond that, however,
the prosecution is entitled to
nothing more, including access to
the material disclosed to the
defense. Since this case was
granted review by the Supreme
Court, we have been explaining to
prosecutors that their right to the
information ripens when the
defense intends to call one of the
witnesses it located with the
Pitchess information pursuant to
the reciprocal discovery rules
(Penal Code § 1054.3). The
Supreme Court adopted this rule
and held this is the proper
procedure.
The court did not leave the
prosecution without a potential
remedy here, though. The
prosecution remains free to seek
Pitchess disclosure by complying
on their own with the Pitchess
discovery requirements or they can
interview the officer themselves to
learn available impeachment
material. Due to the above
suggestions, look for more district
attorney's joining defense Pitchess
motions, serving the notice of
joinder in a timely fashion and
requesting joint Pitchess discovery
that way.
SO WHAT DO WE DO NOW?
Insist upon the court
granting a protective order, similar
to the sample attached, which
prohibits the defense (and the DA,
if they are able to receive it too)
from any use of the information
except in the case under which it
was disclosed.
Resist the temptation to
provide to the prosecutor courtesy
access of the same information
disclosed to the defense unless the
prosecutor complies with the
Evidence Code procedures
beforehand and expect that
prosecutors will now join Pitchess
motions brought by the defense. If
they properly and timely join the
motion, they will probably then be
entitled to the information given to
the defense. In any case, ensure
the court specifically orders
disclosure to both sides before
doing so.
1. This holding is especially
important. If agency counsel
handling Pitchess motions would
routinely seek protective orders such
as the one authorized by this ruling,
(a sample protective order used by
our office is attached for your use)
this should prevent the practice of
some public defender's offices in
maintaining a data base with
Pitchess information accessible. Be
sure to consult competent legal counsel before deciding how to proceed
on any matter to which these cases may be applicable.
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